

# **Appendix A**

## **Annual Treasury Management Outturn Report 2021/22**

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Pendle Borough Council

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# Annual Treasury Management Review 2021/22

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## Purpose

This Council is required by regulations issued under the Local Government Act 2003 to produce an annual treasury management review of activities and the actual prudential and treasury indicators for 2021/22. This report meets the requirements of both the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management, (the Code), and the CIPFA Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities, (the Prudential Code).

During 2021/22 the minimum reporting requirements were that the full Council and the Policy and Resources Committee should receive the following reports:

- an Annual Treasury Strategy in advance of the year (approved by full Council on 24<sup>th</sup> March 2022);
- Due to the ongoing impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic, the mid-year report was not reported. However, an update was reported to the Policy and Resources Committee through the quarter 2 monitoring report on the Council's treasury management activities in the period 1<sup>st</sup> April 2021 to 30<sup>th</sup> September on 25<sup>th</sup> November 2021.
- an annual review following the end of the year describing the activity compared to the strategy, (this report).

In addition, as delegated by Council, the Accounts and Audit Committee has received quarterly treasury management update reports during the year.

The regulatory environment places responsibility on Councillors for the review and scrutiny of treasury management policy and activities. This report is, therefore, important in that respect, as it provides details of the outturn position for treasury activities and highlights compliance with the Council's policies previously approved by members.

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## Introduction and Background

### 1. The Council's Capital Expenditure and Financing

The Council undertakes capital expenditure on long-term assets. These activities may either be:

- Financed immediately through the application of capital or revenue resources (capital receipts, capital grants, revenue contributions etc.), which has no resultant impact on the Council's borrowing need; or
- If insufficient financing is available, or a decision is taken not to apply resources, the capital expenditure will give rise to a borrowing need.

The actual capital expenditure forms one of the required prudential indicators. The table below shows the actual capital expenditure and how this was financed.

£m General Fund	31.3.21 Actual £000	31.3.22 Actual £000
<b>Capital expenditure</b>	5,534	3,740
Financed in year	5,534	3,740
<b>Unfinanced capital expenditure</b>	-	0

### The Council's Overall Borrowing Need

The Council's underlying need to borrow for capital expenditure is termed the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). This figure is a gauge of the Council's indebtedness. The CFR results from the capital activity of the Council and resources used to pay for the capital spend. It represents the 2021/22 unfinanced capital expenditure (see above table), and prior years' net or unfinanced capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for by revenue or other resources.

Part of the Council's treasury activities is to address the funding requirements for this borrowing need. Depending on the capital expenditure programme, the treasury service organises the Council's cash position to ensure that sufficient cash is available to meet the capital plans and cash flow requirements. This may be sourced through borrowing from external bodies, (such as the Government, through the Public Works Loan Board [PWLb], or the money markets), or utilising temporary cash resources within the Council.

**Reducing the CFR** – the Council's underlying borrowing need (CFR) is not allowed to rise indefinitely. Statutory controls are in place to ensure that capital assets are broadly charged to revenue over the life of the asset. The Council is required to make an annual revenue charge, called the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) to reduce the CFR. This is effectively a repayment of the borrowing need. This differs from the treasury management arrangements which ensure that cash is available to meet capital commitments. External debt can also be borrowed or repaid at any time, but this does not change the CFR.

The total CFR can also be reduced by:

- the application of additional capital financing resources, (such as unapplied capital receipts); or
- charging more than the statutory revenue charge (MRP) each year through a Voluntary Revenue Provision (VRP).

The Council's 2022/23 MRP Policy, (as required by DLUHC Guidance), was approved as part of the Treasury Management Strategy Report for 2022/23 on 24<sup>th</sup> March 2022.

The Council's CFR for the year is shown below, and represents a key prudential indicator.

CFR (£m): General Fund	31.3.21 Actual £000	31.3.22 Actual £000
Opening balance	19,830	19,278
Less MRP/VRP*	(552)	(654)
Closing balance	19,278	<b>18,624</b>

\* Includes voluntary application of capital receipts

Borrowing activity is constrained by prudential indicators for gross borrowing and the CFR, and by the authorised limit.

**Gross borrowing and the CFR** - in order to ensure that borrowing levels are prudent over the medium term and only for a capital purpose, the Council should ensure that its gross external borrowing does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the capital financing requirement in the preceding year (2021/22) plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current (2022/23) and next two financial years. This essentially means that the Council is not borrowing to support revenue expenditure. This indicator allowed the Council some flexibility to borrow in advance of its immediate capital needs in 2021/22. The table below highlights the Council's gross borrowing position against the CFR. **The Council has complied with this prudential indicator.**

	31.3.21 Actual £000	31.3.22 Actual £000
Gross borrowing position	22,359	21,359
CFR	19,278	£18,624
Under / over funding of CFR	3,081	£2,735

As the table indicates, the Council is in an 'over' borrowed position as at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022. This is in line with expectations but does require future monitoring.

**The authorised limit** - the authorised limit is the "affordable borrowing limit" required by s3 of the Local Government Act 2003. Once this has been set, the Council does not have the power to borrow above this level. The table below demonstrates that during 2021/22 the Council has maintained gross borrowing within its authorised limit.

**The operational boundary** – the operational boundary is the expected borrowing position of the Council during the year. Periods where the actual position is either below or over the boundary are acceptable subject to the authorised limit not being breached.

**Actual financing costs as a proportion of net revenue stream** - this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

	2021/22 £000
Authorised limit	30,000
Maximum gross borrowing position during the year	30,000
Operational boundary	28,000

## 2. Treasury Position as at 31st March 2022

The Council's treasury management debt and investment position is organised by the treasury management service in order to ensure adequate liquidity for revenue and capital activities, security for investments and to manage risks within all treasury management activities. Procedures and controls to achieve these objectives are well established both through member reporting detailed in the summary, and through officer activity detailed in the Council's Treasury Management Practices. At the end of 2021/22 the Council's treasury position was as follows:

DEBT PORTFOLIO	31.3.21 Principal £000	Rate/ Return	Average Life yrs	31.3.22 Principal £000	Rate/ Return	Average Life yrs
Fixed rate funding:						
- PWLB	22,359	2.93%	24	21,359	2.94%	22
<b>Total debt</b>	<b>22,359</b>			<b>21,359</b>		
<b>CFR</b>	<b>19,278</b>			<b>£18,624m</b>		
<b>Over / (under) borrowing</b>	<b>3,081</b>			<b>£2,735m</b>		
<b>Total investments</b>	<b>17,500</b>	<b>0.23%</b>	<b>All &lt;1yr</b>	<b>26,500</b>	<b>0.80%</b>	<b>All &lt;1yr</b>

The maturity structure of the debt portfolio was as follows:

	31.3.21 Actual £000	2021/22 original limits £000	31.3.22 Actual
Under 12 months	-	-	-
12 months and within 24 months	1,000	1,000	1,000
24 months and within 5 years	3,000	3,500	3,500
5 years and within 10 years	3,000	1,500	1,500
10 years and within 20 years	15,359	15,359	15,359

The Council's investment portfolio as at 31<sup>st</sup> March 2022 is shown in the table below:

<b>INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO</b>	<b>31.3.21 Actual £000</b>	<b>31.3.21 Actual %</b>	<b>31.3.22 Actual £000</b>	<b>31.3.22 Actual %</b>
<b>Treasury investments</b>				
Banks	4,000	22.8%		
Building Societies	7,500	42.9%	7,500	28.3%
Local authorities	6,000	34.3%	6,000	22.7%
DMADF (H M Treasury)			13,000	49.0%
<b>TOTAL TREASURY INVESTMENTS</b>	<b>17,500</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>26,500</b>	<b>100%</b>

The maturity structure of the investment portfolio was as follows:

	<b>31.3.21 Actual £000</b>	<b>2021/22 Budget £000</b>	<b>31.3.22 Actual £000</b>
Investments Up to 365 days (all repayable within 1 year)	17,500	n/a	26,500

### 3. The Treasury Strategy for 2021/22

#### 3.1 Treasury Management Strategy 2022/23

The Council's Treasury Management Strategy for 2022/23 was approved At the Council meeting on 24<sup>th</sup> March 2022.


Aside from reflecting the impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Council's treasury position, the key changes to the Strategy were two-fold:-

- The decision of the Council to not undertake any investment in commercial property, thereby deleting from the Capital Programme for 2020/21 the budget provision of £10m established for this purpose (and with it, the intended borrowing from the PWLB);
- In view of the cashflow position of the Council and the change in interest rates (both short and long term) during the year, the strategy on borrowing was amended so that no new borrowing would be taken before the 2021/22 financial year.


#### 3.2 Investment strategy and control of interest rate risk

As shown in the graph and table below, Investment returns which had been low during 2019/20, plunged during 2020/21 to near zero or even into negative territory. Most local authority lending managed to avoid negative rates and one feature of the year was the growth of inter local authority lending. The expectation for interest rates within the treasury management strategy for 2020/21 was that Bank Rate would continue at the start of the year at 0.75 % before rising to end 2022/23 at 1.25%. This forecast was invalidated by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 which caused the Monetary Policy Committee to cut Bank Rate in March, first to 0.25% and then to 0.10%, in order to counter the hugely negative impact of the national lockdown on large swathes of the economy.

	Bank Rate	7 day	1 mth	3 mth	6 mth	12 mth
<b>High</b>	0.25	0.06	0.06	0.14	0.36	0.73
<b>High Date</b>	17/12/2021	29/12/2021	31/12/2021	31/12/2021	30/12/2021	28/10/2021
<b>Low</b>	0.10	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07	-0.04	0.04
<b>Low Date</b>	01/07/2021	27/08/2021	17/09/2021	08/09/2021	27/07/2021	08/07/2021
<b>Average</b>	0.11	-0.07	-0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.31
<b>Spread</b>	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.20	0.40	0.68



#### Investment Benchmarking Data – Sterling Overnight Index Average 2021/22





Investment returns remained close to zero for much of 2021/22. Most local authority lending managed to avoid negative rates and one feature of the year was the continued growth of inter local authority lending. The expectation for interest rates within the treasury management strategy for 2021/22 was that Bank Rate would remain at 0.1% until it was clear to the Bank of England that the emergency level of rates introduced at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic were no longer necessitated.

The Bank of England and the Government also maintained various monetary and fiscal measures, supplying the banking system and the economy with massive amounts of cheap credit so that banks could help cash-starved businesses to survive the various lockdowns/negative impact on their cashflow. The Government also supplied huge amounts of finance to local authorities to pass on to businesses. This meant that for most of the year there was much more liquidity in financial markets than there was demand to borrow, with the consequent effect that investment earnings rates remained low until towards the turn of the year when inflation concerns indicated central banks, not just the Bank of England, would need to lift interest rates to combat the second-round effects of growing levels of inflation (CPI was 6.2% in February).

While the Council has taken a cautious approach to investing, it is also fully appreciative of changes to regulatory requirements for financial institutions in terms of additional capital and liquidity that came about in the aftermath of the financial crisis. These requirements have provided a far stronger basis for financial institutions, with annual stress tests by regulators evidencing how institutions are now far more able to cope with extreme stressed market and economic conditions.

Investment balances have been kept to a minimum through the agreed strategy of using reserves and balances to support internal borrowing, rather than borrowing externally from the financial markets. External borrowing would have incurred an additional cost, due to the differential between borrowing and investment rates as illustrated in the charts shown above and below. Such an approach has also provided benefits in terms of reducing counterparty risk exposure, by having fewer investments placed in the financial markets.

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### 3.3 Borrowing strategy and control of interest rate risk

During 2021/22, the Council maintained an over-borrowed position. This meant that the capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement) for the year was more than funded with loan debt. This reflected borrowing taken in advance of need in previous years (given interest rates were sufficiently attractive) that will be needed given the underlying need to fund the capital programme.

In view of the cash balances held during the year and the related 'cost of carry', no new borrowing was taken in 2021/22. This is consistent with the agreed Treasury Management Strategy.

A cost of carry remained during the year on any new long-term borrowing that was not immediately used to finance capital expenditure, as it would have caused a temporary increase in cash balances; this would have incurred a revenue cost – the difference between (higher) borrowing costs and (lower) investment returns.

The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this was kept under review to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when this authority may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution was adopted with the treasury operations. The Chief Finance Officer therefore monitored interest rates in financial markets and adopted a pragmatic strategy based upon the following principles to manage interest rate risks:

- if it had been felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings would have been postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing would have been considered.
- if it had been felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than initially expected, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position would have been re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding would have been drawn whilst interest rates were lower than they were projected to be in the next few years.

Interest rate forecasts expected only gradual rises in medium and longer-term fixed borrowing rates during 2021/22 and the two subsequent financial years until the turn of the year, when inflation concerns increased significantly. Internal, variable, or short-term rates, were expected to be the cheaper form of borrowing until well in to the second half of 2021/22.

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Forecasts at the time of approval of the treasury management strategy report for 2021/22 were as follows (choose one from the following tables of forecasts): -

Link Group Interest Rate View 9.11.20														
	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30
25 yr PWLB	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80
50 yr PWLB	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60

Link Group Interest Rate View 8.2.21													
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
10 yr PWLB	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
25 yr PWLB	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20
50 yr PWLB	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00



Link Group Interest Rate 8.3.21												
	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90
25 yr PWLB	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30

If you wish to show how interest rate forecasts changed during 2021/22, these are the forecast tables: -

Link Group Interest Rate View 10.5.21											
	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.25
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.30	0.30	0.30
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.40	0.40
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50
5 yr PWLB	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50
10 yr PWLB	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
25 yr PWLB	2.20	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40



## PWLB RATES 2021/22




## HIGH/LOW/AVERAGE PWLB RATES FOR 2021/22

	1 Year	5 Year	10 Year	25 Year	50 Year
<b>01/04/2021</b>	0.80%	1.20%	1.73%	2.22%	2.03%
<b>31/03/2022</b>	1.91%	2.25%	2.43%	2.64%	2.39%
<b>Low</b>	0.78%	1.05%	1.39%	1.67%	1.25%
<b>Low date</b>	08/04/2021	08/07/2021	05/08/2021	08/12/2021	09/12/2021
<b>High</b>	2.03%	2.37%	2.52%	2.75%	2.49%
<b>High date</b>	15/02/2022	28/03/2022	28/03/2022	23/03/2022	28/03/2022
<b>Average</b>	1.13%	1.45%	1.78%	2.10%	1.85%
<b>Spread</b>	1.25%	1.32%	1.13%	1.08%	1.24%

PWLB rates are based on gilt (UK Government bonds) yields through H.M.Treasury determining a specified margin to add to gilt yields. The main influences on gilt yields are Bank Rate, inflation expectations and movements in US treasury yields. Inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last 30 years in lowering inflation and the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers: this means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. This has pulled down the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last 30 years. We have seen, over the last two years, many bond yields up to 10 years in the Eurozone turn negative on expectations that the EU would struggle to get growth rates and inflation up from low levels. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. Recently, yields have risen since the turn of the year on the back of global inflation concerns.

### Graph of UK gilt yields v. US treasury yields



Gilt yields fell sharply from the spring of 2021 through to September and then spiked back up before falling again through December. However, by January sentiment had well and truly changed, as markets became focussed on the embedded nature of inflation, spurred on by a broader opening of economies post the pandemic, and rising commodity and food prices resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

At the close of the day on 31 March 2022, all gilt yields from 1 to 5 years were between 1.11% – 1.45% while the 10-year and 25-year yields were at 1.63% and 1.84%.

Regarding PWLB borrowing rates, the various margins attributed to their pricing are as follows: -

- **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)

There is likely to be a further rise in short dated gilt yields and PWLB rates over the next three years as Bank Rate is forecast to rise from 0.75% in March 2022 to 1.25% later this year, with upside risk likely if the economy proves resilient in the light of the cost-of-living squeeze. Medium to long dated yields are driven primarily by inflation concerns but the Bank of England is also embarking on a process of Quantitative Tightening when Bank Rate hits 1%, whereby the Bank's £895bn stock of gilt and corporate bonds will be sold back into the market over several years. The impact this policy will have on the market pricing of gilts, while issuance is markedly increasing, is an unknown at the time of writing.

## 4. Borrowing Outturn

**Borrowing** - Due to investment concerns, both counterparty risk and low investment returns, no borrowing was undertaken during the year.

### **Borrowing in advance of need**

The Council has not borrowed more than, or in advance of its needs, purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed.

### **Rescheduling**

No rescheduling was done during the year as the average 1% differential between PWLB new borrowing rates and premature repayment rates made rescheduling unviable.

### **Repayments**

On 31<sup>st</sup> March 2021 the Council repaid £1m at a rate of 2.46% with no breakage costs.

**Summary of debt transactions** – Due to the repayment above, the average cost of the Council's debt increased marginally from 2.91% to 2.93%.


## 5. Investment Outturn

**Investment Policy** – the Council's investment policy is governed by DLUHC investment guidance, which has been implemented in the annual investment strategy approved by full Council on 24<sup>th</sup> March 2022. This policy sets out the approach for choosing investment counterparties, and is based on credit ratings provided by the three main credit rating agencies, supplemented by additional market data, (such as rating outlooks, credit default swaps, bank share prices etc.).

**The investment activity during the year conformed to the approved strategy, and the Council had no liquidity difficulties.**

The graph below shows the actual daily balance of investments during the year. It should be noted that the balance of investments at the start of the year was c£50m reflecting the receipt of funding from Government for the payment of business grants.

	Bank Rate	7 day	1 mth	3 mth	6 mth	12 mth
High	0.25	0.06	0.06	0.14	0.36	0.73
High Date	17/12/2021	29/12/2021	31/12/2021	31/12/2021	30/12/2021	28/10/2021
Low	0.10	-0.09	-0.08	-0.07	-0.04	0.04
Low Date	01/07/2021	27/08/2021	17/09/2021	08/09/2021	27/07/2021	08/07/2021
Average	0.11	-0.07	-0.05	-0.01	0.09	0.31
Spread	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.20	0.40	0.68



As a consequence of the additional funding provided to the Council for the Covid-19 Business Grant Support Programme, there was a technical breach of the Council's Approved Counterparty Limit for Lloyds Bank (the Council's own bank). Action was taken to reduce the balance in Lloyds as early as possible through investments to other organisations within the Council's Approved Counterparty List and details of the breach were reported to the Accounts and Audit Committee.

#### Investments held by the Council

- The Council maintained an average balance of £28.6m of internally managed funds (including funds retained in the Council's own bank account with Lloyds Bank).
- The internally managed funds earned an average rate of return of 0.23%.
- The comparable performance indicator is the average 7-day LIBID rate which was in the range -0.06% to -0.09% for the year.
- Total investment income was £59k compared to a budget of £40k.



## 6. The Economy and Interest Rates

**UK. Economy.** Over the last two years, the coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings until raising it to 0.25% at its meeting on 16<sup>th</sup> December 2021, 0.50% at its meeting of 4<sup>th</sup> February 2022 and then to 0.75% in March 2022.

The UK economy has endured several false dawns through 2021/22, but with most of the economy now opened up and nearly back to business-as-usual, the GDP numbers have been robust (9% y/y Q1 2022) and sufficient for the MPC to focus on tackling the second-round effects of inflation, now that the CPI measure has already risen to 6.2% and is likely to exceed 8% in April.

Gilt yields fell towards the back end of 2021, but despite the war in Ukraine gilt yields have shot higher in early 2022. At 1.38%, 2-year yields remain close to their recent 11-year high and 10-year yields of 1.65% are close to their recent six-year high. These rises have been part of a global trend as central banks have suggested they will continue to raise interest rates to contain inflation.

Historically, a further rise in US Treasury yields will probably drag UK gilt yields higher. There is a strong correlation between the two factors. However, the squeeze on real household disposable incomes arising from the 54% leap in April utilities prices as well as rises in council tax, water prices and many phone contract prices, are strong headwinds for any economy to deal with. In addition, from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2022, employees also pay 1.25% more in National Insurance tax. Consequently, inflation will be a bigger drag on real incomes in 2022 than in any year since records began in 1955.

**Average inflation targeting.** This was the major change in 2020/21 adopted by the Bank of England in terms of implementing its inflation target of 2%. The key addition to the Bank's forward guidance in August 2020 was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and *achieving the 2% target sustainably*". That mantra now seems very dated. Inflation is the "genie" that has escaped the bottle, and a perfect storm of supply side shortages, labour shortages, commodity price inflation, the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions all point to inflation being at elevated levels until well into 2023.

**USA.** The flurry of comments from Fed officials following the mid-March FOMC meeting – including from Chair Jerome Powell himself – hammering home the hawkish message from the mid-March meeting, has had markets pricing in a further 225bps of interest rate increases in 2022 on top of the initial move to an interest rate range of 0.25% - 0.5%.

In addition, the Fed is expected to start to run down its balance sheet. Powell noted that the rundown could come as soon as the next meeting in May.

The upward pressure on inflation from higher oil prices and potential knock-on impacts on supply chains all argue for tighter policy (CPI is estimated at 7.8% across Q1), but the hit to real disposable incomes and the additional uncertainty points in the opposite direction.

More recently, the inversion of the 10y-2y Treasury yield spread at the end of March led to predictable speculation that the Fed's interest rate hikes would quickly push the US economy into recession. Q1 GDP growth is likely to be only between 1.0% and 1.5% annualised (down from 7% in Q4 2021). But, on a positive note, the economy created more than 550,000 jobs per month in Q1, a number unchanged from the post-pandemic 2021 average. Unemployment is only 3.8%.

**EU.** With euro-zone inflation having jumped to 7.5% in March it seems increasingly likely that the ECB will accelerate its plans to tighten monetary policy. It is likely to end net asset purchases in June – i.e., earlier than the Q3 date which the ECB targeted in March. And the market is now anticipating possibly three 25bp rate hikes later this year followed by more in 2023. Policymakers have also hinted strongly that they would re-start asset purchases if required. In a recent speech, Christine Lagarde said “we can design and deploy new instruments to secure monetary policy transmission as we move along the path of policy normalisation.”

While inflation has hit the headlines recently, the risk of recession has also been rising. Among the bigger countries, Germany is most likely to experience a “technical” recession because its GDP contracted in Q4 2021, and its performance has been subdued in Q1 2022. However, overall, Q1 2022 growth for the Eurozone is expected to be 0.3% q/q with the y/y figure posting a healthy 5.2% gain. Finishing on a bright note, unemployment fell to only 6.8% in February.

**China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 of 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of the year; however, 2021 has seen the economy negatively impacted by political policies that have focussed on constraining digital services, restricting individual freedoms, and re-establishing the power of the One-Party state. With the recent outbreak of Covid-19 in large cities, such as Shanghai, near-term economic performance is likely to be subdued. Official GDP numbers suggest growth of c4% y/y, but other data measures suggest this may be an overstatement.

**Japan.** The Japanese economic performance through 2021/22 is best described as tepid. With a succession of local lockdowns throughout the course of the year, GDP is expected to have risen only 0.5% y/y with Q4 seeing a minor contraction. The policy rate has remained at -0.1%, unemployment is currently only 2.7% and inflation is sub 1%, although cost pressures are mounting.

**World growth.** World growth is estimated to have expanded 8.9% in 2021/22 following a contraction of 6.6% in 2020/21.

**Deglobalisation.** Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing globalisation i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last 30 years, which now accounts for 18% of total world GDP (the USA accounts for 24%), and Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, has unbalanced the world economy. In addition, after the pandemic exposed how frail extended supply lines were around the world, both factors are now likely to lead to a sharp retrenchment of economies into two blocs of western democracies v. autocracies. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China (and to a much lesser extent Russia) to supply products and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates.

**Central banks’ monetary policy.** During the pandemic, the governments of western countries have provided massive fiscal support to their economies which has resulted in a big increase in total government debt in each country. It is therefore very important that bond yields stay low while debt to GDP ratios slowly subside under the impact of economic growth. This provides governments with a good reason to amend the mandates given to central banks to allow higher average levels of inflation than we have generally seen over the last couple of decades. Both the Fed and Bank of England have already changed their policy towards implementing their existing mandates on inflation, (and full employment), to hitting an

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average level of inflation. Greater emphasis could also be placed on hitting subsidiary targets e.g. full employment before raising rates. Higher average rates of inflation would also help to erode the real value of government debt more quickly.

## 7. Other Issues

### 1. IFRS 9 fair value of investments

*English authorities:* Following the consultation undertaken by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG] (now renamed the Department of Levelling Up, Housing & Communities) on IFRS 9 the Government previously introduced a mandatory statutory override for local authorities to reverse out all unrealised fair value movements resulting from pooled investment funds. This was effective from 1 April 2018. The statutory override applies for five years from this date. Local authorities are required to disclose the net impact of the unrealised fair value movements in a separate unusable reserve throughout the duration of the override in order for the Government to keep the override under review and to maintain a form of transparency.

Risk management will need to take account of the 2018/19 Accounting Code of Practice proposals for the valuation of investments. Whilst for many authorities, this may not be a significant issue, key considerations are included in our Technical Release, (TRA14, 29 August 2017), including:

- Expected credit loss model. Whilst this should not be material for vanilla treasury investments such as bank deposits, this is likely to be problematic for some funds e.g. property funds, (and also for non-treasury management investments dealt with in the capital strategy e.g. longer dated service investments, loans to third parties or loans to subsidiaries).
- The valuation of investments previously valued under the available for sale category e.g. equity related to the “commercialism” agenda, property funds, equity funds and similar, will be changed to **Fair Value through the Profit and Loss (FVPL)**.

### 2. Non-treasury management investments.

As these may comprise a significant proportion of the total investment portfolio for some local authorities, and also account for a significant proportion of the total income generated by the whole investment portfolio, those local authorities may wish to consider writing some form of high level summary report to include in, or append to, this annual treasury management review report, on non-treasury investments, so as to give members an overview of the whole investment portfolio. Such a report could deal with significant purchases, their objectives, how they have been appraised, how they have been financed, and what powers were used to undertake these purchases. On the other hand, some local authorities may feel that information on non-treasury investments is more suitable to include in the capital strategy reports and reviews.

You may also wish to consider adding some wording if you have changed a strategy of purchasing commercial property to generate income, in the light of the Government’s guidance on the terms applicable ahead of PWLB borrowing; this blocks access to all PWLB borrowing in any year in which the capital programme includes expenditure on an asset purchased purely to obtain yield.

### 3. Changes in risk appetite

The 2018 CIPFA Codes and guidance notes have placed enhanced importance on risk management. Where an authority changes its risk appetite e.g., for moving surplus cash into or out of certain types of investment funds or other types of investment instruments, this change in risk appetite and policy should be brought to members' attention in treasury management update reports.

#### **4. Counterparty limits**

Clients may need to consider adding wording if they have amended their counterparty limits in view of the level of grants etc. that have come from Government to help deal with the coronavirus outbreak.

#### **5. Sovereign limits**

Clients may need to consider adding wording if they have amended their policy on minimum sovereign ratings as a result of the UK being downgraded to AA- in March 2020. (We would suggest a policy of lending to UK banks and building societies plus banks in other countries with sovereign ratings of a minimum of AA-.)

#### **6. IFRS 16**

You may wish to add in some wording to explain that the implementation of IFRS16 bringing currently off-balance sheet leased assets onto the balance sheet, has been delayed until 2024/25.

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## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

*This is an optional area which clients may wish to include in their report if they feel that members would appreciate having this list of abbreviations and definitions.*

**ALMO:** an Arm's Length Management Organisation is a not-for-profit company that provides housing services on behalf of a local authority. Usually an ALMO is set up by the authority to manage and improve all or part of its housing stock.

**CE:** Capital Economics - is the economics consultancy that provides Link Group, Treasury solutions, with independent economic forecasts, briefings and research.

**CFR:** capital financing requirement - the council's annual underlying borrowing need to finance capital expenditure and a measure of the council's total outstanding indebtedness.

**CIPFA:** Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy – the professional accounting body that oversees and sets standards in local authority finance and treasury management.

**CPI:** consumer price index – the official measure of inflation adopted as a common standard by countries in the EU. It is a measure that examines the weighted average of prices of a basket of consumer goods and services, such as transportation, food and medical care. It is calculated by taking price changes for each item in the predetermined basket of goods and averaging them.

**ECB:** European Central Bank - the central bank for the Eurozone

**EU:** European Union

**EZ:** Eurozone -those countries in the EU which use the euro as their currency

**Fed:** the Federal Reserve System, often referred to simply as "the Fed," is the central bank of the United States. It was created by the Congress to provide the nation with a stable monetary and financial system.

**FOMC:** the Federal Open Market Committee – this is the branch of the Federal Reserve Board which determines monetary policy in the USA by setting interest rates and determining quantitative easing policy. It is composed of 12 members--the seven members of the Board of Governors and five of the 12 Reserve Bank presidents.

**GDP:** gross domestic product – a measure of the growth and total size of the economy.

**G7:** the group of seven countries that form an informal bloc of industrialised democracies--the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom--that meets annually to discuss issues such as global economic governance, international security, and energy policy.

**Gilts:** gilts are bonds issued by the UK Government to borrow money on the financial markets. Interest paid by the Government on gilts is called a coupon and is at a rate that is fixed for the duration until maturity of the gilt, (unless a gilt is index linked to inflation); while the coupon rate is fixed, the yields will change inversely to the price of gilts i.e. a rise in the price of a gilt will mean that its yield will fall.

**HRA:** housing revenue account.

**IMF:** International Monetary Fund - the lender of last resort for national governments which get into financial difficulties.

**LIBID:** the London Interbank Bid Rate is the rate bid by banks on deposits i.e., the rate at which a bank is willing to borrow from other banks. It is the "other end" of the LIBOR (an offered, hence "ask" rate, the rate at which a bank will lend). These benchmarks ceased on 31<sup>st</sup> December 2021 and have, generally, been replaced by SONIA, the Sterling Overnight Index Average.

**MHCLG:** the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government - the Government department that directs local authorities in England.

**MPC:** the Monetary Policy Committee is a committee of the Bank of England, which meets for one and a half days, eight times a year, to determine monetary policy by setting the official interest rate in the United Kingdom, (the Bank of England Base Rate, commonly called Bank Rate), and by making decisions on quantitative easing.

**MRP:** minimum revenue provision - a statutory annual minimum revenue charge to reduce the total outstanding CFR, (the total indebtedness of a local authority).

**PFI:** Private Finance Initiative – capital expenditure financed by the private sector i.e. not by direct borrowing by a local authority.

**PWLB:** Public Works Loan Board – this is the part of H.M. Treasury which provides loans to local authorities to finance capital expenditure.

**QE:** quantitative easing – is an unconventional form of monetary policy where a central bank creates new money electronically to buy financial assets, such as government bonds, (but may also include corporate bonds). This process aims to stimulate economic growth through increased private sector spending in the economy and also aims to return inflation to target. These purchases increase the supply of liquidity to the economy; this policy is employed when lowering interest rates has failed to stimulate economic growth to an acceptable level and to lift inflation to target. Once QE has achieved its objectives of stimulating growth and inflation, QE will be reversed by selling the bonds the central bank had previously purchased, or by not replacing debt that it held which matures. The aim of this reversal is to ensure that inflation does not exceed its target once the economy recovers from a sustained period of depressed growth and inflation. Economic growth, and increases in inflation, may threaten to gather too much momentum if action is not taken to 'cool' the economy.

**RPI:** the Retail Price Index is a measure of inflation that measures the change in the cost of a representative sample of retail goods and services. It was the UK standard for measurement of inflation until the UK changed to using the EU standard measure of inflation – Consumer Price Index. The main differences between RPI and CPI is in the way that housing costs are treated and that the former is an arithmetical mean whereas the latter is a geometric mean. RPI is often higher than CPI for these reasons.

**SONIA:** the Sterling Overnight Index Average. Generally, a replacement set of indices (for LIBID) for those benchmarking their investments. The benchmarking options include using a forward-looking (term) set of reference rates and/or a backward-looking set of reference rates that reflect the investment yield curve at the time an investment decision was taken.

**TMSS:** the annual treasury management strategy statement reports that all local authorities are required to submit for approval by the full council before the start of each financial year.

**VRP:** a voluntary revenue provision to repay debt, in the annual budget, which is additional to the annual MRP charge, (see above definition).