Treasury Management Strategy Statement

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy

Pendle Borough Council
2021/22

INDEX

1.INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities (arising usually from capital expenditure), and are separate from the day to day treasury management activities.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

> *"The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

1.2 Reporting requirements

1.2.1 Capital Strategy

The CIPFA 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report that will provide the following:

- a high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the Full Council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

The Capital Strategy is reported separately from this Treasury Management Strategy Statement; Non-treasury investments will be reported through the former. This ensures the separation of the core treasury funded under security, liquidity and yield (SLY) principles, and the policy and commercialism investments usually driven by expenditure on an asset.

The Council's Capital Strategy was revised and approved by Council at its meeting on 25th February 2021 (and is still considered fit for purpose). For clarity, this Council has not engaged in any commercial investments to date.

1.2.2 Treasury Management reporting

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

a. **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:

    - the capital plans, (including prudential indicators);
    - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
    - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
    - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

b. **A mid-year treasury management report –** This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision. In addition, quarterly update reports are submitted for consideration by the Accounts and Audit Committee.

c. **An annual treasury report –** This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

Scrutiny

As indicated above, the scrutiny role is fulfilled by the Accounts and Audit Committee to whom quarterly reports on treasury management activity are submitted.

1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22

The Strategy for 2021/22 covers two main areas:

Capital issues

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

1.4 Training

The CIPFA Code requires the Responsible Officer (in Pendle's case, this is the Chief Finance Officer) to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Councillors responsible for scrutiny (in the Council's case, this is the Accounts and Audit Committee). The training needs of Councillors is continually assessed during the year and training will be arranged as required.

The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed as part of the Council's annual Performance Management Review (appraisal) process.

1.5 Treasury management consultants

The Council uses Link Group, Treasury Solutions, as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

At this stage, the scope of the Council's investments will include only conventional treasury investments (the placing of residual cash from the Council's functions). It is unlikely that in the near term that the Council will make commercial type investments, such as commercial investment properties. In the event that does happen, there may be a requirement for the Council to retain the services of specialist advisors. Should that be necessary, any decision to do so will be reported to the Council's Policy and Resources Committee.

2 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2021/22 – 2023/24

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

2.1 Capital expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Table 1: Capital Expenditure to 2023/24

Capital expenditure	2019/20 Actual £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000	2023/24 Estimate £000
Private Sector Housing	1,201	1,763	850	850	850
Environmental Services	370	103	149	70	70
Parks and Grounds Maintenance	258	195	145	100	100
Asset Renewal (excl. Parks)	267	101	348	210	117
Area Committees	218	611	170	170	170
Resource Procurement	375	3,875	200	100	100
Other General Capital Schemes	358	620	494	325	300
Total	**3,047**	**7,268**	**2,355**	**1,825**	**1,707**

Other long-term liabilities - The above financing need excludes other long-term liabilities, such as leasing arrangements that already include borrowing instruments.
The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Table 2: Financing of Capital Expenditure to 2023/24

Financing of capital expenditure	2019/20 Actual £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000	2023/24 Estimate £000
Total Expenditure	3,047	7,268	2,355	1,825	1,707
Financed by:					
Capital receipts	1,348	2,395	1,025	100	100
Capital grants	1,636	4,306	850	850	850
Revenue	61	12	-	-	-
Other funding (eg s106 Funds)	2	30	-	-	-
Net financing need	**-**	**525**	**480**	**875**	**757**

2.2 The Council’s borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council’s Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council’s indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for through a revenue or capital resource, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each asset’s life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.

The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council’s borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the lease provider and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has no such schemes within the CFR.

Similarly, accounting code changes applicable from 2022/23, will require current hire/operating lease costs to be shown on Balance Sheet (IFRS16). These sums will impact on the CFR but will also include a borrowing facility, as above. These sums are not currently included in the CFR projections below but will be calculated for inclusion and presented to Committee later in the year as part of an updated TMSS.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

Table 3: Estimated Capital Financing Requirement to 2023/24

	2019/20 Actual £000	**2020/21 Estimate £000**	**2021/22 Estimate £000**	**2022/23 Estimate £000**	**2023/24 Estimate £000**
Capital Financing Requirement					
CFR – services	19,928	19,974	23,005	25,372	26,768
CFR – Commercial Investments	-	-	-	-	-
Total CFR	**19,928**	**19,974**	**23,005**	**25,372**	**26,768**
Movement in CFR		**46**	**3,031**	**2,367**	**1,396**

Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)		525	480	875	757
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements – Services		(479)	(549)	(613)	(660)
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements– Commercial Investments *1		-	-	(214)	(220)
Movement in CFR		**46**	**3,031**	**2,367**	**1,396**

*1 – These are indicative amounts and subject to review annually as part of the review of the Council’s Capital Expenditure plans.

2.3 Core funds and expected investment balances

The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

Table 4: Core Funds and Expected Investment Balances

Year End Resources £m	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
Fund balances / reserves	6,124	4,688	4,427	3,552	3,302
Capital receipts	1,348	2,395	1,025	100	100
Provisions	2,299	2,299	2,299	2,299	2,299
Total core funds	**9,811**	**7,714**	**7,918**	**5,552**	**5,402**
Working capital*	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Under/over borrowing**	68	5,580	(1,385)	(344)	(245)
Expected investments	**10,879**	**14,294**	**7,533**	**6,208**	**6,157**

*Working capital balances shown are estimated year-end; these may be higher mid-year

2.4 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement*:*

For capital expenditure incurred **before 1 April 2008** or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be:

- **Based on CFR** – MRP will be based on the CFR (option 2) but adopting a charge of 2.5% per annum (40 year asset life) on a straight line basis rather than 4% (25 year asset life) as assumed in the guidance on a reducing balance; under the latter , the debt is never fully repaid unlike the former which results in debt being repaid within 40 years;

For capital expenditure **from 1 April 2008** for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

- **Asset life method** – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (option 3 per MHCLG regulations) using the annuity method under which annual payments gradually increase during the life of the asset. Option 3 must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under Capitalisation Direction. ;

Repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.

MRP Overpayments - A change introduced by the revised MHCLG MRP Guidance was the allowance that any charges made over the statutory minimum revenue provision (MRP), voluntary revenue provision or overpayments, can, if needed, be reclaimed in later years if deemed necessary or prudent. In order for these sums to be reclaimed for use in the budget, this policy must disclose the cumulative overpayment made each year.

Exceptions to the MRP Policy – There are currently the following exceptions to the MRP policy stated above:

- In late 2016, the Council agreed to advance a loan of £1.1m to Pendle Leisure Trust to be repaid over a 12-year term. As part of the approved Budget for 2020/21, the loan term was re-profiled and extended by 5 years. The principal element of the repayments by the Trust constitute capital receipts. The intention is to set these receipts aside in lieu of MRP to provide for the loan repayment to the Council.
- Any borrowing to finance housing projects using the Brownfield Regeneration Fund will also be excluded from the requirement to for an MRP charge. If such borrowing is undertaken, the intention is to repay this borrowing from the capital receipts generated by the sale of properties over a period of up to 5 years.
- A similar approach may be taken on other ‘regeneration’ type schemes where it is the intention to repay any debt financing from the subsequent disposal proceeds over a ‘short’ period (usually limited to 5 years).

3 BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current portfolio position

The Council's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt, against the underlying capital borrowing need, (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

Table 5: Current Portfolio Position

	2019/20 Actual £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000	2023/24 Estimate £000
External Debt					
Debt at 1 April	20,767	23,456	22,456	22,956	25,456
Expected Debt Repayments	(311)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)	(1,000)
Expected Replacement Debt	-	-	-	-	-
Expected New Debt					
• Non Commercial	3,000	-	1,500	3,500	1,000
• Commercial		-	-	-	-
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	120	-	-	-	-
Expected change in OLTL	(120)	-	-	-	-
Actual gross debt at 31 March	**23,456**	**22,456**	**22,956**	**25,456**	**25,456**
The Capital Financing Requirement	**19,928**	**19,974**	**23,005**	**25,372**	**26,768**
Under / (over) borrowing	**(3,528)**	**(2,482)**	**49**	**174**	**1,312**

Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, **except in the short term**, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Chief Executive, as Chief Finance Officer for 2020/21 financial year, reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans (as approved in the indicative Capital Programme for 2021/24), and the proposals in this report.

3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

The operational boundary. This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

Table 6: Operational Boundary

	2020/21 Estimate £000	**2021/22 Estimate £000**	**2022/23 Estimate £000**	**2023/24 Estimate £000**
Debt				
• Non Commercial	26,000	28,000	28,000	29,000
• Commercial ***1**	-	-	-	-
Other long term liabilities	500	500	500	500
Total	**26,500**	**38,500**	**28,500**	**39,500**

*1 – The Council will not undertake any commercial investments in 2021/22

The authorised limit for external debt. This is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a legal limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Table 7: Authorised Limit

	2020/21 Estimate £000	**2021/22 Estimate £000**	**2022/23 Estimate £000**	**2023/24 Estimate £000**
Debt				
- Non Commercial	30,000	30,000	30,000	31,000
- Commercial ***1**	-	-	-	
Other long term liabilities	500	500	500	500
Total	**30,500**	**30,500**	**30,500**	**41,500**

*1 – The Council will not undertake any commercial investments in 2021/22

3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 9.2.21. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80 bps.

Link Group Interest Rate View	8.2.21												
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
10 yr PWLB	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
25 yr PWLB	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20
50 yr PWLB	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- *Please note that we have made a slight change to our interest rate forecasts table above for forecasts for 3, 6 and 12 months. Traditionally, we have used LIBID forecasts, with the rate calculated using market convention of 1/8th (0.125%) taken off the LIBOR figure. Given that all LIBOR rates up to 6m are currently running below 10bps, using that convention would give negative figures as forecasts for those periods. However, the liquidity premium that is still in evidence at the short end of the curve means that the rates actually being achieved by local authority investors are still modestly in positive territory. While there are differences between counterparty offer rates, our analysis would suggest that an average rate of around 10 bps is achievable for 3 months, 10bps for 6 months and 20 bps for 12 months.*
- *During 2021, Link will be continuing to look at market developments in this area and will monitor these with a view to communicating with clients when full financial market agreement is reached on how to replace LIBOR. This is likely to be an iteration of the overnight SONIA rate and the use of compounded rates and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates for forecasting purposes.*
- *We will maintain continuity by providing clients with LIBID investment benchmark rates on the current basis.*

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March to cut Bank Rate to first 0.25%, and then to 0.10%, it subsequently left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings, including its last meeting on 4th February 2021, although some forecasters had suggested that a cut into negative territory could happen. However, at that last meeting, we were informed that financial institutions were not prepared for implementing negative rates. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), therefore, requested that the Prudential Regulation Authority require financial institutions to prepare for such implementation if, at any time in the future, the MPC may wish to use that as a new monetary policy tool. The MPC made it clear that this did not in any way imply that they were about to use this tool in the near future. As shown in the forecast table above, no increase in Bank Rate is expected in the near-term as it is unlikely that inflation will rise sustainably above 2% during this period so as to warrant increasing Bank Rate.

Gilt yields / PWLB rates

There was much speculation during the second half of 2019 that bond markets were in a bubble which was driving bond prices up and yields down to historically very low levels. The context for that was a heightened expectation that the US could have been heading for a recession in 2020. In addition, there were growing expectations of a downturn in world economic growth, especially due to fears around the impact of the trade war between the US and China, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued. Combined, these conditions were conducive to very low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last 30 years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers. This means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc.

The consequence of this has been the gradual lowering of the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last 30 years. Over the year prior to the coronavirus crisis, this has seen many bond yields up to 10 years turn negative in the Eurozone. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin was that bond prices were elevated as investors would have been expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities.

Gilt yields had, therefore, already been on a generally falling trend up until the coronavirus crisis hit western economies during March 2020. After gilt yields spiked up in March 2020, we have subsequently seen these yields fall sharply to unprecedented lows as investors panicked during March in selling shares in anticipation of impending recessions in western economies, and moved cash into safe haven assets i.e. government bonds. However, major western central banks took rapid action to deal with excessive stress in financial markets during March, and started massive quantitative easing purchases of government bonds: this also acted to put downward pressure on government bond yields at a time when there has been a huge and quick expansion of government expenditure financed by issuing government bonds. Such unprecedented levels of issuance in “normal” times would have caused bond yields to rise sharply. Gilt yields and PWLB rates have been at remarkably low rates so far during 2020/21.

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is expected to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next two years as government bond yields of major countries around the world are expected to rise little during this time in an environment where central bank rates are also expected to remain low for some years; this is the result of a change of inflation targeting policy of central banks to one based on average inflation over a number of years, (see appendix 5.3 for further explanation). From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment, (as shown on 9th November 2020 when the first results of a successful COVID-19 vaccine trial were announced). Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Investment and borrowing rates

- **Investment returns** are likely to remain exceptionally low during 2021/22 with little increase in the following two years.

- **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England: indeed, gilt yields up to six years were negative during most of the first half of 2020/21; they jumped up after the Monetary Policy Report of 4th February 2021. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.

- On 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The new margins over gilt yields are as follows: -.

  - **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
  - **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

- **Borrowing for capital expenditure.** As Link's long-term forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%, and all PWLB rates are under 2.00%, there is now value in borrowing from the PWLB for all types of capital expenditure for all maturity periods, especially as current rates are near to historic lows. The Council will assess its risk appetite in conjunction with budgetary pressures to reduce total interest costs. Although short-term interest rates are cheapest, longer-term borrowing could also be undertaken for the purpose of certainty, where that is desirable, or for flattening the profile of a heavily unbalanced maturity profile.

- While this authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure, to replace maturing debt and the rundown of reserves, there will be a *cost of carry*, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.

3.4 Borrowing strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an over-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has been fully funded with loan debt. However, as the table above indicates, it is likely that the level of prudential borrowing will mean the Council will become under-borrowing during the year and will need to consider borrowing.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2021/22 treasury operations. The Chief Finance Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in borrowing rates,* (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then borrowing will be postponed.

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in borrowing rates than that currently forecast,* perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity, or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

Based on current plans, and assuming no new borrowing in the current financial year, it is expected that the Council will need to undertake net additional borrowing of £6m in the period to 2023/24 (see Table 5 above).

As ever, this position will be maintained under review with any decisions reported to the Policy and Resources Committee and/or the Accounts and Audit Committee as appropriate.

3.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

3.6 Debt rescheduling

As short-term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long-term debt to short-term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred). The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

The decision whether to reschedule debt rest with the Chief Financial Officer who will, as required, seek the advice of Link Asset Services. All rescheduling will be reported to the Policy and Resources Committee and the Accounts and Audit Committee at the earliest meetings following its action.

3.7 New financial institutions as a source of borrowing and / or types of borrowing

Currently the PWLB Certainty Rate is set at gilts + 80 basis points for both HRA and non-HRA borrowing. However, consideration may still need to be given to sourcing funding from the following sources for the following reasons:

- Local authorities (primarily shorter dated maturities out to 3 years or so – still cheaper than the Certainty Rate).
- Financial institutions (primarily insurance companies and pension funds but also some banks, out of forward dates where the objective is to avoid a "cost of carry" or to achieve refinancing certainty over the next few years).
- Municipal Bonds Agency (possibly still a viable alternative depending on market circumstances prevailing at the time).

Our advisors will keep us informed as to the relative merits of each of these alternative funding sources.

4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

4.1 Investment policy – management of risk

The Council's investment policy has regard to the following: -

- MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

Fundamentally, the Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return). The Council will aim to achieve the optimum return (yield) on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity and with the Council's risk appetite. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short term to cover cash flow needs. However, where appropriate (from an internal as well as external perspective), the Council will also consider the value available in periods up to 12 months with high credit rated financial institutions, as well as wider range fund options.

The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA places a high priority on the management of risk. This authority has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

1. Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.

2. **Other information:** ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as **"credit default swaps"** and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

3. **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the financial sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

4. This authority has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that the treasury management team are authorised to use. There are two lists in appendix 5.4 under the categories of 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments.

    - **Specified investments** are those with a high level of credit quality and subject to a maturity limit of one year.

    - **Non-specified investments** are those with less high credit quality, may be for periods in excess of one year, and/or are more complex instruments which require greater consideration by members and officers before being authorised for use. ***The Council will not use Non-Specified Investments***

5. **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the creditworthiness policy outlined in paragraph 4.2.

6. **Transaction limits** are set for each type of investment in 4.2.

7. Investments will only be placed with counterparties from the UK in accordance with approved minimum lending criteria, (see paragraph 4.3).

8. This Council has engaged **external consultants**, (see paragraph 1.5), to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this authority in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.

9. All investments will be denominated in **sterling**.

10. As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2020/21 under IFRS 9, this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], concluded a consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years ending 31.3.23.)

However, this Council will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see paragraph 4.5). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

Changes in risk management policy from last year.
The above criteria are broadly unchanged from the Treasury Management Strategy, as amended, for 2020/21.

4.2 Creditworthiness policy

The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Chief Finance Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

The Council applies the creditworthiness service provided by the Link Group. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies – Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

Use of additional information other than credit ratings. Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information (for example Credit Default Swaps, rating Watches/Outlooks) will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment opportunities.

Time and monetary limits applying to investments. The time and monetary limits for institutions on the Council's counterparty list are as shown at Appendix 5.6 (these will cover both specified and non-specified investments).

UK banks – ring fencing

The largest UK banks, (those with more than £25bn of retail / Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) deposits), are required, by UK law, to separate core retail banking services from their investment and international banking activities by 1st January 2019. This is known as "ring-fencing". Whilst smaller banks with less than £25bn in deposits are exempt, they can choose to opt up. Several banks are very close to the threshold already and so may come into scope in the future regardless.

Ring-fencing is a regulatory initiative created in response to the global financial crisis. It mandates the separation of retail and SME deposits from investment banking, in order to improve the resilience and resolvability of banks by changing their structure. In general, simpler, activities offered from within a ring-fenced bank, (RFB), will be focused on lower risk, day-to-day core transactions, whilst more complex and "riskier" activities are required to be housed in a separate entity, a non-ring-fenced bank, (NRFB). This is intended to ensure that an entity's core activities are not adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group.

While the structure of the banks included within this process may have changed, the fundamentals of credit assessment have not. The Council will continue to assess the new-formed entities in the same way that it does others and those with sufficiently high ratings, (and any other metrics considered), will be considered for investment purposes.

4.3 Other limits

Due care will be taken to consider the exposure of the Council's total investment portfolio to non-specified investments, countries, groups and sectors.

a) **Non-specified investment limit.** The Council has determined that it will not use non specified investments.

b) **Country limit.** The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from the UK. In 2016, the Council agreed to exclude the UK sovereign rating from its minimum sovereign rating criteria and this is still considered appropriate.

c) **Other limits.** In addition:

- Despite the exclusion of the UK rating the Council will only invest with UK institutions that meet the approved minimum lending criteria.

4.4 Investment strategy

In-house funds. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.

- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

Investment returns expectations.
Bank Rate is unlikely to rise from 0.1% for over the life of this strategy. It is very difficult to say when it may start rising so it may be best to assume that investment earnings will be sub 0.50% for the foreseeable future.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows (the long term forecast is for periods over 10 years in the future):

2020/21	0.10%
2021/22	0.10%
2022/23	0.10%
2023/24	0.10%
2024/25	0.25%
Long term later years	2.00%

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now probably more to the upside but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus - both domestically and its potential effects worldwide.

- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates anytime soon and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, or a return of investor confidence in equities, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

Negative investment rates

While the Bank of England said in August / September 2020 that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, and in February 2021 stated that financial institutions would not be ready to implement negative rates for six months, some deposit accounts were offering negative rates for shorter periods prior to this latest announcement. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in cash balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.

As for money market funds (MMFs), yields have fallen near to zero. Some managers have resorted to trimming fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remain in positive territory where possible and practical. The Council has not to date used MMFs for investment purposes and will only do so with advice from Link Treasury Services.

Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to the surge in the levels of cash seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur or when further large receipts will be received from the Government.

4.5 Investment performance / risk benchmarking

This Council will use an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio of 7 day LIBID. The Council is appreciative that the provision of LIBOR and associated LIBID rates is expected to cease at the end of 2021. It will work with its advisors in determining suitable replacement investment benchmark(s) ahead of this cessation and will report back to members accordingly.

4.6 End of year investment report

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

5 APPENDICES

(These can be appended to the report or omitted as required)

1. Prudential and treasury indicators
2. Interest rate forecasts
3. Economic background
4. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management (option 1)
5. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management (option 2)
6. Approved countries for investments
7. Treasury management scheme of delegation
8. The treasury management role of the section 151 officer

5.1 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS 2021/22 – 2023/24

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

5.1.1 Capital expenditure

Capital expenditure	2019/20 Actual £000	2020/21 Estimate £000	2021/22 Estimate £000	2022/23 Estimate £000	2023/24 Estimate £000
Private Sector Housing	**1,201**	**1,763**	**850**	**850**	**850**
Environmental Services	**370**	**103**	**149**	**70**	**70**
Parks and Grounds Maintenance	**258**	**195**	**145**	**100**	**100**
Asset Renewal (excl. Parks)	**267**	**101**	**348**	**210**	**117**
Area Committees	**218**	**611**	**170**	**170**	**170**
Resource Procurement	**375**	**3,875**	**200**	**100**	**100**
Other General Capital Schemes (incl. waste collection)	**358**	**620**	**494**	**325**	**300**
Total	**3,047**	**7,268**	**2,355**	**1,825**	**1,707**

5.1.2 Affordability prudential indicators – any new ones?

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council's overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

a. Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital, (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income), against the net revenue stream.

%	2020/21 Estimate	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
Total	9.56	9.93	11.50	11.48

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in the budget report of 11th February 2021.

5.1.3 Maturity structure of borrowing

Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2021/22		
	Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months	0%	20%
12 months to 2 years	0%	30%
2 years to 5 years	0%	40%
5 years to 10 years	0%	60%
10 years and above	0%	100%
Maturity structure of variable interest rate borrowing 2021/22		
	Lower	Upper
Under 12 months	0%	25%
12 months to 2 years	0%	25%
2 years to 5 years	0%	25%
5 years to 10 years	0%	0%
10 years and above	0%	0%

5.2 INTEREST RATE FORECASTS 2021-2024

PWLB forecasts shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Link Group Interest Rate View	8.2.21												
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
10 yr PWLB	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
25 yr PWLB	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20
50 yr PWLB	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Bank Rate													
Link	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Capital Economics	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate													
Link	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
Capital Economics	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate													
Link	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
Capital Economics	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate													
Link	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20
Capital Economics	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate													
Link	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Capital Economics	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	-	-	-	-	-

5.3 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

UK. The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) kept **Bank Rate** and quantitative easing (QE) unchanged on 4th February. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a third national lockdown which started on 5th January, which is obviously going to delay economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. Moreover, it had already decided in November to undertake a further tranche of quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn, to start in January when the previous programme of £300bn of QE, announced in March to June 2020, finished. As only about £16bn of the latest £150bn tranche had been used towards the end of January, it felt that there was already sufficient provision for QE - which would be made to last to the end of 2021. This implied that the current rate of purchases of £4.4bn per week would be slowed during the year.

Although its short-term forecasts were cut for 2021, the medium-term forecasts were more optimistic than in November, based on an assumption that the current lockdown will be gradually eased after Q1 as vaccines are gradually rolled out and life can then start to go back to some sort of normality. The Bank's main assumptions were:

- The economy would start to **recover strongly** from Q3 2021.
- **£125bn of savings** made by consumers during the pandemic will give a significant boost to the pace of economic recovery once lockdown restrictions are eased and consumers can resume high street shopping, going to pubs and restaurants and taking holidays.
- The economy would still recover to reach its **pre-pandemic level** by Q1 2022 despite a long lockdown in Q1 2021.
- **Spare capacity** in the economy would be eliminated in Q1 2022.
- The Bank also expects there to be **excess demand** in the economy by Q4 2022.
- **Unemployment** will peak at around 7.5% during late 2021 and then fall to about 4.2% by the end of 2022. This forecast implies that 0.5m foreign workers will have been lost from the UK workforce by their returning home.
- **CPI inflation** was forecast to rise quite sharply towards the 2% target in Q1 2021 due to some temporary factors, (e.g. the reduction in VAT for certain services comes to an end) and given developments in energy prices. CPI inflation was projected to be close to 2% in 2022 and 2023.
- The Monetary Policy Report acknowledged that there were **downside risks** to their forecasts e.g. from virus mutations, will vaccines be fully effective, how soon can tweaked vaccines be devised and administered to deal with mutations? There are also issues around achieving herd immunity around the world from this virus so that a proliferation of mutations does not occur which prolong the time it takes for the global economy to fully recover.
- The Report also mentioned a potential **upside risk** as an assumption had been made that consumers would only spend £6bn of their savings of £125bn once restrictions were eased. However, the risk is that that consumers could spend a lot more and more quickly.
- The Bank of England also removed **negative interest rates** as a possibility for at least six months as financial institutions were not yet ready to implement them. As in six months' time the economy should be starting to grow strongly, this effectively means that negative rates occurring are only a slim possibility in the current downturn. However, financial institutions have been requested to prepare for them so that, at a future time, this could be used as a monetary policy tool if deemed appropriate. (**Gilt yields and PWLB rates** jumped upwards after the removal of negative rates as a key risk in the short-term.)

- Prior to 4th February, the **MPC's forward guidance** outlined that the sequencing of a withdrawal of monetary policy support would be that Bank Rate would be increased first, and only once it had reached a certain level, 'around 1.5%', before a start would be made on winding down the stock of asset purchases made under QE. However, the MPC decided at the February meeting that this policy should be reviewed as to whether a start should be made first on **winding down QE** rather than raising Bank Rate.
- The MPC reiterated its previous guidance that Bank Rate would not rise until inflation was sustainably above 2%. This means that it will tolerate inflation running above 2% from time to time to balance out periods during which inflation was below 2%. This is termed **average inflation targeting.**

- **There are two views in respect of Bank Rate beyond our three-year time horizon:**
  1. The MPC will be keen to raise Bank Rate as soon as possible in order for it to be a usable tool when the next economic downturn comes along. This is in line with thinking on Bank Rate over the last 20 years.
  2. Conversely, that we need to adjust to the new post-pandemic era that we are now in. In this new era, the shift to average inflation targeting has set a high bar for raising Bank Rate i.e. only when inflation is demonstrably sustainably above 2%. In addition, many governments around the world have been saddled with high levels of debt. When central bank rates are low, and below the average GDP growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio will gradually fall each year without having to use fiscal tools such as raising taxes or austerity programmes, (which would depress economic growth and recovery). This could therefore result in governments revising the setting of mandates to their national central banks to allow a higher rate of inflation linked to other economic targets. This is the Capital Economics view – that Bank Rate will not rise for the next five years and will probably then struggle to get to 1% within 10 years.

- **Public borrowing** was forecast in November 2020 by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery. It is now likely that total borrowing will probably reach around £420bn due to further Government support measures introduced as a result of further restrictions and the third national lockdown.

- Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4 2019. While the one month second national lockdown that started on 5th November caused a further contraction of 5.7% m/m in November, this was much better than had been feared and showed that the economy is adapting to new ways of working. This left the economy 'only' 8.6% below the pre-crisis level. However, a strong recovery from a further contraction during quarter 1 2021 is expected in the second half of 2021 and is likely to mean that the economy recovers to its pre-pandemic level during Q1 2022.

- **Vaccines – the game changer.** The Pfizer announcement on 9th November of a successful vaccine has been followed by approval of the Oxford University/AstraZeneca and Moderna vaccines. The Government has set a target to vaccinate 14 million people in the most at risk sectors of the population by 15th February; it has made good, and accelerating progress in hitting that target. The aim is also to vaccinate all over 50s by May and all adults by September. This means that the national lockdown starting in early January, could be replaced by regional tiers of lighter restrictions, beginning possibly in Q2. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines have radically improved the economic outlook so that it may now be possible for GDP to recover to its pre-virus level as early as Q1 2022. These vaccines have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for when life returns to normal.
- Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that **in the second half of this decade**, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The major concern though, is that new mutations of the virus might defeat the current batch of vaccines. However, work is already advanced to produce what may well become annual revaccinations each autumn with updated vaccines. In addition, countries around the world have ramped up vaccine production facilities and vastly improved testing regimes; they are therefore now much better equipped to deal effectively with any new outbreaks of mutations of this virus.

Chart: Level of real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100)



(if unable to print in colour - the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.

This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade, would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to around 2.5% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR's most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital

Economics forecasts in the graphs above and below, assumed that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perversely!), depress economic growth and recovery.

Chart: Public Sector Net Borrowing (as a % of GDP)



(if unable to print in colour - the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.

- There will still be some **painful longer term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a **reversal of globalisation** as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, **digital services** are one area that has already seen huge growth.
- **Brexit.** The final agreement of a trade deal on 24.12.20 has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. However, it is evident from problems with trade flows at ports in January and February, that work needs to be done to smooth out the issues and problems that have been created by complex customs paperwork, in order to deal with bottle necks currently being caused.
- **Fiscal policy.** In December, the Chancellor made a series of announcements to provide further support to the economy: -
  - An extension of the COVID-19 loan schemes from the end of January 2021 to the end of March.
  - The furlough scheme was lengthened from the end of March to the end of April.
  - The Budget on 3.3.21 will lay out the “next phase of the plan to tackle the virus and protect jobs”. This does not sound like tax rises are imminent, (which could hold back the speed of economic recovery).
- The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6.8.20 revised down the expected credit losses for the banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment, “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.

- **US.** Following elections for two senate seats in January, the Democrats now have a majority in the House of Representatives and a very slim majority in the Senate based on the vice president's casting vote. As the Democrats will be dependent on gaining the support of moderate Democrat senators, there will be a limit on just how radical they can be with their legislative and financial programmes. The $900bn fiscal stimulus passed in December will help the economy gain more traction in early 2021. There is a question mark, however, over whether they will be able to get a much bigger $1.9bn fiscal stimulus through both houses, though a smaller package would stand much more chance of being approved. The rapid roll out of vaccines is well on course to vaccinate nearly the entire population by the end of the summer; this will help to underpin a strong economic recovery in 2021 after the economy wilted during Q4 2020 as more restrictions were imposed to contain the pandemic.
- After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and in 2020), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that under this new regime of average inflation targeting, that officials expected to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. Where the Fed has led in changing its monetary policy to one based on average inflation targeting in response to the damage that this pandemic has done to the economy, there was much expectation that other major central banks would also follow suit.
- Subsequent meetings of the Fed have projected that **inflation** will not get back sustainably to above 2% for some years and so the vast majority of Fed officials expect the Fed funds rate to still be at near-zero until 2024 or later. The key message is that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields lower than might otherwise be expected, although treasury yields have increased somewhat due to financial markets adjusting to expectations of higher rates of inflation.

- **EU.** The economy was recovering well from the first lockdowns towards the end of Q2 and during Q3 after a sharp drop in GDP. However, a second wave of the virus has caused a renewed fall back in growth during Q4. The slow role out of vaccines during Q1 2021 will delay economic recovery. In Q2 of 2020, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by "only" 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth contracted by another 0.7% in Q4 and is likely to at least stagnate during Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has seriously affected many countries. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the countries most affected by the first wave.

- With **inflation** expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, **the ECB** has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB's December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme, (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities for an additional year until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO, (cheap loans to banks), were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank's forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer once the EU can get a comprehensive vaccination scheme up and running, although growth will struggle before later in quarter 2 of 2021.

- **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in the rest of 2020; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies. However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.

- **Japan.** A third round of fiscal stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That's huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government's latest fiscal effort should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone. However, on the negative side, it has also been struggling - despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus - to get out of a deflation trap for many years and to achieve consistent, significant GDP growth. Moreover, it has not consistently managed to raise inflation up to its target level of 2% and it is making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

- **World growth.** World growth has been in recession in 2020 and this is likely to continue into the first half of 2021 before recovery in the second half. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.

- Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

Summary

Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand and the pace of recovery in their economies.

If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.

INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now probably more to the upside but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus - both domestically and its potential effects worldwide.

- There is relatively little domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate in the near-term, nor significant changes in shorter-term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates anytime soon but increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates).

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, resulting in further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions.
- **UK government** takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand and the pace of recovery of the economy.
- **UK - Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows due to complications with customs paperwork or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant issues. A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.** The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for "weaker" countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next two or three years. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.
- **German minority government & general election in 2021.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she will remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Italy, Spain, Austria, Sweden, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU, and they had threatened to derail the 7 year EU budget until a compromise was thrashed out in late 2020. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

- **UK -** a significant rise in inflationary pressures e.g. caused by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population, leading to a rapid resumption of normal life and return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

5.4 TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (TMP1) – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 364 days**, meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS: The Council will not invest in Non-Specified Investments.

The criteria, time limits and monetary limits applying to institutions or investment vehicles are:

	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	**** Max % of total investments / £ limit per institution**	**Max. maturity period**
DMADF – UK Government	yellow	Unlimited	6 months (max. is set by the DMO*)
UK Government Treasury bills	yellow		364 days (max. is set by the DMO*)
Money Market Funds (CCLA Public Sector Deposit Fund only)	AAA	£1m	Liquid
Principal Local authorities	N/A	£3m (£6m for Lancashire County Council)	364 days
Term deposits/Instant Access with UK Banks meeting approved credit criteria	Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	Range between £2.5m and £10m (£10m is restricted to Lloyds Group as Banker to the Council)	Upto 364 days Upto 364 days 6 months 100 days Not for use
Certificate of Deposits (CDs) with designated UK Banks and Building Societies	Blue Orange Red Green No Colour	£1m	Upto 364 days Upto 364 days 6 months 100 days Not for use
Term deposits/Instant Access with non UK Banks meeting approved credit criteria	Red Green	£2.5m £1m	Upto 6 months Upto 100 days

The Council's minimum ratings criteria relating to the above, as per Fitch Rating Agency, are summarised below:

Long-term rating:	A-
Short-term rating:	F1
Viability:	BB+
Support:	5

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

5.5 TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (TMP1) – CREDIT AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT

The MHCLG issued Investment Guidance in 2018, and this forms the structure of the Council's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.

The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this Council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes (2017). In accordance with the Code, the Chief Finance Officer has produced its treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

Annual investment strategy - The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of following:

- The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments.
- The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.
- Specified investments that the Council will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the Council, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than 364 days.

The investment policy proposed for the Council is:

Strategy guidelines – The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

Specified investments – These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity, or those which could be for a longer period but where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These are considered low risk assets where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include sterling investments which would not be defined as capital expenditure with:

1. The UK Government (such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility, UK treasury bills with less than one year to maturity).
2. Supranational bonds of less than one year's duration.
3. A local authority, housing association, parish council or community council.
4. *Pooled* investment vehicles (such as money market funds currently CCLA Public Sector Deposit Fund only) that have been awarded a high credit rating by a credit rating agency.
5. A body that is considered of a high credit quality (such as a bank or building society).

5.6 APPROVED COUNTRIES FOR INVESTMENTS

This list is based on those countries which have sovereign ratings of AA- or higher, (we show the lowest rating from Fitch, Moody's and S&P) and also, (except - at the time of writing - for Hong Kong, Norway and Luxembourg), have banks operating in sterling markets which have credit ratings of green or above in the Link Asset Services credit worthiness service.

Based on lowest available rating

AAA

- Australia
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Canada
- Finland
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France

AA-

- Belgium
- Hong King
- Qatar
- UK

APPROVED COUNTERPARTY LENDING LIST (updated 23/10/20)

	Counterparty	Type of Institution	Sovereign Rating	Fitch Ratings (@ 23rd October 2020 per LAS Weekly Credit Rating List) Long Term	Short Term	Viability	Support	Group Limit £M	Individual Limit £M	Maximum Duration (Mths / Days)
	Pendle BC's Minimum Ratings Criteria	***(per Fitch)***		***A-***	***F1***	***BB+***	***5***			
	UK Banks									
1	HSBC Bank PLC (Non Ring Fenced Bank	Bank	(AA)	AA-	F1+	a	1	2.500	2.500	up to 364 days
	HSBC Bank PLC (Ring Fenced Bank)	Bank	(AA)	AA-	F1+	a	1		2.500	up to 364 days
2	Barclays Bank PLC (Non Ring Fenced Ba	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	5	2.500	2.500	up to 6 months
	Barclays Bank UK PLC (Ring Fenced Bar	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	1		2.500	up to 6 months
3	Santander UK PLC	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	2		2.500	up to 6 months
	Royal Bank of Scotland							3.000		
4	NatWest Bank PLC (Ring Fenced Bank)	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	5		2.500	up to 364 days
5	The RBS PLC (Ring Fenced Bank)	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	5		2.500	up to 364 days
	Lloyds Banking Group plc							10.000		
6	- Lloyds Bank PLC (Ring Fenced Bank)	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	5		10.000	up to 6 months
7	- Bank of Scotland PLC (Ring Fenced Ba	Bank	(AA)	A+	F1	a	5		2.500	up to 6 months
	Other									
8	Principal Local Authorities	All UK Principal Counc	(AA)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		3.000	up to 364 days
		LCC Call-Account	(AA)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		6.000	up to 364 days
9	Debt Management Office - Deposit Facility		(AA)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		Unlimited	up to 6 months
10	CCLA - PSDF	Money Market Fund	(AA)		AAAmmf				1.000	Liquid Funds
	Building Societies									
11	Nationwide	Building Society	(AA)	A	F1	a	5		3.000	up to 6 months
12	Coventry	Building Society	(AA)	A-	F1	a-	5		2.500	up to 6 months
13	Leeds	Building Society	(AA)	A-	F1	a-	5		2.500	up to 100 days

Additional Notes

1 No investments should exceed 364 days

2 Where feasible:-

a) there should be no more than 75% of the Council's investments in any single sector with the exception of Principal Local Authorities

b) there should be no fewer than 4 counterparties in use at any one point in time

If the above conditions are breached as a result of the maturity of fixed rate loans, action should be taken as soon as possible to comply with these requirements

3 Whilst UK Treasury Bills (max. of £2.5m) have been approved for investment purposes the preparatory work to enable the use of these has not been progressed.

4 Certificates of Deposit (maximum of £1m total investment) are now an approved means of investment (approved by executive August 2013) - counterparties currently remain limited to those above

5 PSDF MMF account is now operative - maximum of £1m - min. investment £25k - no investment may be made to this without prior approval of CFO.

6 LCC maximum of £6m (excluding HACA balance) is subject to the investment with LCC not exceeding 50% of the total under investment (excluding Lloyds current account balance) at any time.

7 Monetary limits refer to principal sums invested.

8 Fitch investment grade ratings range from AAA to BBB, STC ratings range from F1+ to D, Viability ratings range from aaa to f.

5.7 TREASURY MANAGEMENT SCHEME OF DELEGATION

(i) Full Council

- Initial Approval and adoption of the Treasury Management Policy Statement and subsequent revisions (as and when required).
- Approval of the Annual Treasury Management Strategy/Annual Investment Strategy and Policy on the Minimum Revenue Provision and consideration and approval of any in year changes (in March each year for the forthcoming financial year);
- Approval of the Council's Capital Strategy and related Capital Programme.

(ii) Policy and Resources Committee

- Annual Treasury Management outturn Report (by October each year for the previous financial year);
- Mid-Year Treasury Management Report (by September of each year for the year in question);
- Strategic Monitoring Report (Quarterly).

(iii) Accounts and Audit Committee

- approval/amendments to the Council's adopted Treasury Management Practices (TMPs);
- Receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- Scrutiny of treasury management performance and strategy.

5.8 THE TREASURY MANAGEMENT ROLE OF THE SECTION 151 OFFICER

The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long term timeframe.
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and, where applicable, non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long term liabilities
- provision to Councillors of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees
- ensuring that Councillors are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by the Council
- ensuring that the Council has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following:-
- Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;
- Performance measurement and management (TMP2 and schedules), including methodology and criteria for assessing the performance and success of non-treasury investments;
- Decision making, governance and organisation (TMP5 and schedules), including a statement of the governance requirements for decision making in relation to non-treasury investments; and arrangements to ensure that appropriate professional due diligence is carried out to support decision making;
- Reporting and management information (TMP6 and schedules), including where and how often monitoring reports are taken;

- Training and qualifications (TMP10 and schedules), including how the relevant knowledge and skills in relation to non-treasury investments will be arranged.