APPENDIX A

PENDLE BOROUGH COUNCIL

Treasury Management Strategy Statement

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy

2016/17

INDEX

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

> *"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."*

1.2 Reporting requirements

The Council approves the overall policy and strategy within which the treasury management activity takes place. Within this framework the approach followed at Pendle currently is one in which update reports are then presented to the Executive (at mid-year and year-end). An overview of the process is provided below:

Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy (this report) - The first, and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

This report is submitted to Council for approval annually in March.

A mid year treasury management report – This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators where required (subject to Council approval) and whether any policies require revision. This report is submitted to the Executive, normally in the October cycle of meetings.

An annual treasury report – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy. This report is submitted to the Executive, normally in the July/August cycle of meetings.

Scrutiny (In year monitoring)

This role is undertaken by the Accounts and Audit Committee who receive quarterly updates on treasury management activity during the year.

1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17

The strategy for 2016/17 covers two main areas:

Capital issues
- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

Treasury management issues
- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, DCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and DCLG Investment Guidance.

1.4 Training

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsibe for scrutiny. Training needs will be discussed with members of the Accounts and Audit Committee during the year. The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed as part of the annual appraisal process.

1.5 Treasury management consultants

The Council uses Capita Asset Services (CAS), Treasury Solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

2 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2016/17 – 2018/19

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist Councillors' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

2.1 Capital expenditure

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Councillors are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts:

Capital expenditure £'000	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Housing	3,758	1,382	4,941	565	545
Environmental & Transport Schemes	55	39	53	0	0
Waste Collection	79	24	66	0	0
Community Safety	8	7	129	0	0
Asset Renewal	159	205	688	200	200
Resource Procurement	970	186	1,128	0	0
Area Committees	352	237	308	100	100
Parks and Recreation	73	63	54	80	60
Other Capital Projects	330	914	581	105	115
Total	**5,784**	**3,057**	**7,948**	**1,050**	**1,020**

Other long term liabilities. The above financing need excludes other long term liabilities, such as leasing arrangements which already include borrowing instruments.

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

Capital expenditure £m	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Total	**5,784**	**3,057**	**7,948**	**1,050**	**1,020**
Financed by:					
Capital receipts	1,941	300	300	100	100
Capital grants / contributions	1,657	791	431	350	320
Revenue funding	933	695	100	100	100
Net financing need for the year	**1,253**	**1,271**	**7,117**	**500**	**500**

2.2 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life.

The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. As at 31st March 2015 the Council had £90k of such schemes within the CFR.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

£'000	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Capital Financing Requirement					
Total CFR	**14,286**	**15,149**	**21,831**	**21,707**	**21,569**
Movement in CFR		**863**	**6,682**	**(124)**	**(138)**

Movement in CFR represented by					
Net financing need for the year (above)		1,271	7,117	500	500
Less MRP and other financing movements		(408)	(435)	(624)	(638)
Movement in CFR		**863**	**6,682**	**(124)**	**(138)**

2.3 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

DCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Council to approve **an MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or which in the future will be Supported Capital Expenditure, the MRP policy will be:

Existing practice - MRP will follow the existing practice outlined in former DCLG regulations (option 1);

This option provides for an approximate 4% reduction in the borrowing need (CFR) each year.

From 1 April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including finance leases) the MRP policy will be:

Asset life method – MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (option 3 per DCLG regulations) using the annuity method under which annual payments gradually increase during the life of the asset. Option 3 must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction.

Repayments included in finance leases are applied as MRP.

Exceptions to the above MRP Policy

Should the Council opt to participate in the Local Authority Partnership Purchase Scheme or Custom/Self Build using the cash backed option, the mortgage lenders require a 5 year cash advance from the council to match the 5 year life of the indemnity. The cash advance placed with the mortgage lender provides an integral part of the mortgage lending, and should therefore be treated as capital expenditure and a loan to a third party. The Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) will increase by the amount of the total indemnity. The cash advance is due to be returned in full at maturity, with interest paid annually. Once the cash advance matures and funds are returned to the local authority, the returned funds are classed as a capital receipt, and the CFR will reduce accordingly. As this is a temporary (5 year) arrangement and the funds will be returned in full, there is no need to set aside prudent provision to repay the debt liability in the interim period, so there is no MRP application. The position should be reviewed on an annual basis.

The Council also plans to borrow to finance specific housing projects notably in support of the Brownfield Regeneration Fund established in the sum of £1.5m. When this borrowing is undertaken the intention is to repay this borrowing from the capital receipts generated by the sale of properties over a period of up to 5 years. In a similar fashion to the scenario outlined above, any capital expenditure incurred under these projects will increase the CFR. However, as it is intended to repay any associated borrowing from receipts over a 5 year term it is felt there is no need to set aside provision to repay the debt liability in the interim period, and hence there will be no MRP set aside in these circumstances. This position will also be subject to annual review.

A similar approach may be taken on other ‘regeneration’ type schemes where it is the intention to repay any debt financing from subsequent disposal proceeds over a ‘short’ period of time (usually up to 5 years).

To limit the potential exposure under this approach, debt on which MRP will initially not be provided will be capped at a maximum of £5m subject to the associated MRP liability (were it required) not exceeding an annual equivalent of £150k.

2.4 Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital and control of borrowing prudential indicators, but within this framework prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the Council’s overall finances. The Council is asked to approve the following indicators:

2.5 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

%	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Ratio	5.48	7.30	7.70	10.00	10.58

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals agreed by Council when approving the capital and revenue budgets in February 2016.

2.6 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on council tax

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published on a 'confirmed' basis over a three period.

Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the band D council tax

	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Council tax - band D	£11.91	£24.65	£25.82

3 BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current portfolio position

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2015, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£'000	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
External Debt					
Debt at 1 April	9,359	14,595	15,499	18,993	20,486
Expected change in Debt	5,000	1,000	3,500	1,500	0
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	286	0	0	0	0
Expected change in OLTL	(50)	(96)	(6)	(7)	(7)
Actual gross debt at 31 March	**14,595**	**15,499**	**18,993**	**20,486**	**20,479**
The Capital Financing Requirement	**14,286**	**15,149**	**21,831**	**21,707**	**21,569**
Under / (over) borrowing	**(309)**	**(350)**	**2,838**	**1,221**	**1,090**

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2016/17 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

The Financial Services Manager reports that the Council will comply with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals agreed as part of the Council's budget in February.

3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

The operational boundary. This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

Operational boundary £'000	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Debt	22,000	22,000	22,000	22,000
Other long term liabilities	500	500	500	500
Total	22,500	22,500	22,500	22,500

The authorised limit for external debt. A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

1. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.
2. The Council is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Authorised limit £m	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Debt	23,000	23,000	23,000	23,000
Other long term liabilities	500	500	500	500
Total	23,500	23,500	23,500	23,500

3.3 Prospects for interest rates

The Council has appointed Capita Asset Services (CAS) as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table gives their central view.

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19
5yr PWLB Rate	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%
25yr PWLB Rate	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.10%
50yr PWLB Rate	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%

The following economic commentary has been provided by CAS with more detail in Appendix 5.3.

UK. GDP growth rates in 2013 of 2.2% and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and although the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again, it looks likely to disappoint previous forecasts and come in at about 2.2%. Quarter 1 of 2015 was weak at +0.4% (+2.9% y/y) though there was a slight increase in quarter 2 to +0.5% (+2.3% y/y) before weakening again to +0.4% (2.1% y/y) in quarter 3 followed by a slight recovery in quarter 4 to an initial reading of +0.5%. The Februaryr Bank of England Inflation Report included a forecast for growth to remain around 2.2% – 2.4% over the next three years, driven mainly by strong consumer demand as the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers has been reversed by a recovery in wage inflation at the same time that CPI inflation has fallen to, or near to, zero since February 2015.

However, these forecasts are approximately 0.2% lower than those of the November Inflation Report. Investment expenditure is also expected to support growth. However, since the second half of 2015, most worldwide economic statistics have been weak and financial markets have been particularly volatile in early 2016. The November Inflation Report flagged up particular concerns for the potential impact of these factors on the UK and this theme was maintained in the February Inflation Report.

The February Inflation Report was notably subdued in respect of the forecasts for inflation in the near-term; this was expected to barely get back up to the 1% level within the next 12 months but was expected to marginally exceed the 2% target on the 2-3 year time horizon. The increase in the November Inflation Report forecast for inflation at the three year horizon was the biggest in a decade and at the two year horizon was the biggest since February 2013. However, the first round of falls in oil, gas and food prices over late 2014 and also in the first half 2015, will fall out of the 12 month calculation of CPI during late 2015 / early 2016 but a second, more recent round of falls in fuel and commodity prices will delay a significant tick up in inflation from around zero. There is, therefore, considerable uncertainty around how quickly pay and CPI inflation will rise in the next few years and this makes it difficult to forecast when the MPC will decide to make a start on increasing Bank Rate. There is also the uncertain impact of the EU referendum which may take place as early as June 2016.

The weakening of UK GDP growth during 2015 and the deterioration of prospects in the international scene, especially for emerging market countries, have consequently led to forecasts for when the first increase in Bank Rate would occur being pushed back to quarter 1 of 2017. There is downside risk to this forecast i.e. it could be pushed further back and the markets are currently betting on a quarter 1 2018 increase.

USA. The American economy made a strong comeback after a weak first quarter's growth at +0.6% (annualised), to grow by no less than 3.9% in quarter 2 of 2015, but then pulled back to 2.0% in quarter 3 and retreated to +0.7% in quarter 4. However, the uninterrupted run of strong monthly increases in non-farm payrolls figures for growth in employment in 2015 prepared the way for the Fed. to embark on its long awaited first increase in rates of 0.25% at its December meeting. However, the accompanying message with this first increase was that further increases will be at a much slower rate, and to a much lower ultimate ceiling, than in previous business cycles, mirroring comments by our own MPC.

EZ. In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it was intended to run initially to September 2016. At the ECB's December meeting, this programme was extended to March 2017 but was not increased in terms of the amount of monthly purchases. The ECB also cut its deposit facility rate by 10bps from -0.2% to -0.3%. This programme of monetary easing has had a limited positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to some improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.3% y/y) but has then eased back to +0.4% (+1.6% y/y) in quarter 2 and to +0.3% (+1.6%) in quarter 3. Financial markets were disappointed by the ECB's lack of more decisive action in December and it is likely that it will need to boost its QE programme if it is to succeed in significantly improving growth in the EZ and getting inflation up from the current level of around zero to its target of 2%.

Greece. During July, Greece finally capitulated to EU demands to implement a major programme of austerity and is now cooperating fully with EU demands. An €86bn third bailout package has since been agreed though it did nothing to address the unsupportable size of total debt compared to GDP. However, huge damage has been done to the Greek banking system and economy by the resistance of the Syriza Government, elected in January, to EU demands. The surprise general election in September gave the Syriza government a mandate to stay in power to implement austerity measures. However, there are major doubts as to whether the size of cuts and degree of reforms required can be fully implemented and so Greek exit from the euro may only have been delayed by this latest bailout.

Portugal and Spain. The general elections in September and December respectively have opened up new areas of political risk where the previous right wing reform-focused pro-austerity mainstream political parties have lost their majority of seats. An anti-austerity coalition has won a majority of seats in Portugal while the general election in Spain produced a complex result where no combination of two main parties is able to form a coalition with a majority of seats. It is currently unresolved as to what administrations will result from both these situations. This has created nervousness in bond and equity markets for these countries which has the potential to spill over and impact on the whole Eurozone project.

The current economic outlook and structure of market interest rates and government debt yields have several key treasury management implications:

- Investment returns are likely to remain relatively low during 2016/17 and beyond;
- Borrowing interest rates have been highly volatile during 2015 as alternating bouts of good and bad news have promoted optimism, and then pessimism, in financial markets. Gilt yields have continued to remain at historically low levels during 2015. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times, when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new borrowing which causes an increase in investments as this will incur a revenue loss between borrowing costs and investment returns.

3.4 Borrowing strategy

As at 31st March 2015 the Council maintained an over-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), had been fully funded with loan debt rather than by cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow. This position is forecast to be mirrored again with modest over-borrowing per the table in 3.1 above projected at £350k by 31st March 2016. This position is expected to unwind over the next financial year reverting to an under-borrowed position on current plans.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2016/17 treasury operations. The Financial Services Manager will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates* (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast,* perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised with the likely action that fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are still lower than they will be in the next few years.

Based on current plans it is expected that net additional borrowing of £3.5m will be undertaken in 2016/17. This comprises 'normal' borrowing of £2m and the sum of £1.5m to finance the Brownfield Development Fund.

This position will be maintained under review with any decisions reported to the Executive and the Accounts and Audit Committee as appropriate.

Treasury management limits on activity

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The Council is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

£m	**2016/17**	**2017/18**	**2018/19**
Interest rate exposures			
	Upper	**Upper**	**Upper**
Limits on fixed interest rates based on net debt	100%	100%	100%
Limits on variable interest rates based on net debt	25%	25%	25%
Limits on fixed interest rates: • **Debt only** • **Investments only**	 100% 100%	 100% 100%	 100% 100%
Limits on variable interest rates • ***Debt only*** • ***Investments only***	 25% 25%	 25% 25%	 25% 25%

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2016/17		
	Lower	**Upper**
Under 12 months	0%	25%
12 months to 2 years	0%	30%
2 years to 5 years	0%	40%
5 years to 10 years	0%	60%
Over 10 years	0%	100%
Maturity structure of variable interest rate borrowing 2016/17		
	Lower	Upper
Under 12 months	0%	25%
12 months to 2 years	0%	25%
2 years to 5 years	0%	25%
5 years to 10 years	0%	0%
Over 10 years	0%	0%

3.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

3.6 Debt rescheduling

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt. All rescheduling will be reported to the Executive and the Accounts and Audit Committee, at the earliest meeting following its action.

3.7 Municipal Bond Agency

It is likely that the Municipal Bond Agency, currently in the process of being set up, will be offering loans to local authorities in the near future. It is also hoped that the borrowing rates will be lower than those offered by the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). The Council will consider the use of this new source of borrowing as and when appropriate and may borrow via the Agency rather than the PWLB where it is considered cost-effective to do so.

4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

Introduction: changes to credit rating methodology

The main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) have, through much of the financial crisis, provided some institutions with a ratings "uplift" due to implied levels of sovereign support. Commencing in 2015, in response to the evolving regulatory regime, all three agencies have begun removing these "uplifts" with the timing of the process determined by regulatory progress at the national level. The process has been part of a wider reassessment of methodologies by each of the rating agencies. In addition to the removal of implied support, new methodologies are now taking into account additional factors, such as regulatory capital levels. In some cases, these factors have "netted" each other off, to leave underlying ratings either unchanged or little changed. A consequence of these new methodologies is that they have also lowered the importance of the (Fitch) Support and Viability ratings and have seen the (Moody's) Financial Strength rating withdrawn by the agency.

In keeping with the agencies' new methodologies, the rating element of our CAS's own credit assessment process now focuses solely on the Short and Long Term ratings of an institution. While this is the same process that has always been used for Standard & Poor's, this has been a change in the use of Fitch and Moody's ratings. It is important to stress that the other key elements to our process, namely the assessment of Rating Watch and Outlook information as well as the Credit Default Swap (CDS) overlay have not been changed.

The evolving regulatory environment, in tandem with the rating agencies' new methodologies also means that sovereign ratings are now of lesser importance in the assessment process. Where through the crisis, clients typically assigned the highest sovereign rating to their criteria, the new regulatory environment is attempting to break the link between sovereign support and domestic financial institutions. While the Council understands the changes that have taken place, it will continue to specify a minimum sovereign rating of AA+. This is in recognition of the fact that the underlying domestic and where appropriate, international, economic and wider political and social background will still have an influence on the ratings of a financial institution.

It is important to stress that these rating agency changes do not reflect any changes in the underlying status or credit quality of the institution. They are merely reflective of a reassessment of rating agency methodologies in light of enacted and future expected changes to the regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate. While some banks have received lower credit ratings as a result of these changes, this does not mean that they are suddenly less credit worthy than they were formerly. Rather, in the majority of cases, this mainly reflects the fact that implied sovereign government support has effectively been withdrawn from banks.

They are now expected to have sufficiently strong balance sheets to be able to withstand foreseeable adverse financial circumstances without government support. In fact, in many cases, the balance sheets of banks are now much more robust than they were before the 2008 financial crisis when they had higher ratings than now. However, this is not universally applicable, leaving some entities with modestly lower ratings than they had through much of the "support" phase of the financial crisis.

4.1 Investment policy

The Council's investment policy has regard to the DCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the DCLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.3 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council's treasury management practices – schedules.

4.2 Creditworthiness policy

The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, whilst liquidity and yield (i.e. return on the investment) are also considerations. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Financial Services Manager will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and report them to Members as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

The Council has access to the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit Watches and credit Outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council to determine the suggested duration for investments. The Council will therefore use designated counterparties within the following durational bands:

- Blue 364 days (only applies to nationalised/part-nationalised UK banks)
- Orange 364 days
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour Not to be used

Linked to this the Council has developed a counterparty lending list which presently limits investments to the following:

- Designated UK Banks meeting minimum credit rating criteria (defined by reference to Fitch ratings);
- UK Building Societies (currently only Nationwide and the Coventry Building Societies but this could change subject to other institutions meeting our minimum credit rating criteria);
- Principal Local Authorities;
- UK Government (Debt Management Office and Treasury Bills/Gilts);
- Money Market Funds (currently only the CCLA Public Sector Deposit Fund but this is to be reviewed in 2016);
- Designated Non-UK banks meeting minimum credit rating criteria (defined by reference to Fitch ratings) – currently only Svenska Handelsbanken is used);

The Capita Asset Services' creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Typically, the minimum credit ratings criteria the Council uses (per Fitch) will be a:

- Short-term rating F1
- Long-term rating A-
- Viability rating BB+ (where this continues)
- Support Rating 5

All credit ratings will be monitored weekly. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita Asset Services' creditworthiness service.

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Financial Services Manager, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.

- on occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest.

- in addition to the use of credit ratings the Council will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Capita Asset Services. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Council's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Council will also use market data and market information, information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

4.3 Country and sector limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA+ (from Fitch or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.4. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by the Financial Services Manager should ratings change in accordance with this policy. This list will be maintained under regular review as with credit ratings generally.

4.4 Sector Limits

In addition to the limits outlined above the Council also applies the following operational limits as part of the treasury management activity:

- Investments in any one sector (i.e. Banks, Building Societies, Money Market Funds, Local Govt) should not exceed 75% of the funds under investment with the exception of Principal Local Authorities;
- There should be no fewer than 4 counterparties in use at any point in time;

4.5 Investment strategy

In-house funds. Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Investment returns expectations. Bank Rate is forecast to remain unchanged at 0.5% before starting to rise from quarter 1 of 2017. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2016/17 0.75%
- 2017/18 1.25%
- 2018/19 1.75%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year are as follows:

- 2016/17 0.60%
- 2017/18 1.25%
- 2018/19 1.75%
- 2019/20 2.00%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently to the downside (i.e. the start of increases in Bank Rate occurs later). However, should the pace of growth quicken and / or forecasts for increases in inflation rise, there could be an upside risk.

Investment treasury indicator and limit – No principal funds will be invested for periods greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its instant access and notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits (overnight to100 days) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

4.6 Investment risk benchmarking

The Council will use an investment benchmark to assess the investment performance of its investment portfolio of 7 day LIBID. Note: This benchmark is an average risk of default measure, and would not constitute an expectation of loss against a particular investment.

4.7 End of year investment report

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

5 APPENDICES

(These can be appended to the report or omitted as required)

1. Interest rate forecasts
2. Economic background
3. Treasury management practice 1 – credit and counterparty risk management
4. Approved countries for investments
5. Treasury management scheme of delegation
6. The treasury management role of the section 151 officer

5.1 APPENDIX: Interest Rate Forecasts 2016 - 2019

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19
Bank Rate View	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%
3 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.30%	1.60%	1.80%	1.90%
6 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.70%	0.70%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.40%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	2.00%	2.20%
12 Month LIBID	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.50%	1.70%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.30%	2.40%
5yr PWLB Rate	1.70%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%
25yr PWLB Rate	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.80%
50yr PWLB Rate	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%
Bank Rate													
Capita Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate													
Capita Asset Services	1.70%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%
Capital Economics	2.10%	2.20%	2.50%	2.55%	2.80%	2.80%	3.05%	3.05%	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate													
Capita Asset Services	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%
Capital Economics	2.85%	2.85%	3.10%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.45%	3.45%	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate													
Capita Asset Services	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.80%
Capital Economics	2.85%	2.85%	3.10%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.45%	3.45%	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate													
Capita Asset Services	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%
Capital Economics	2.90%	2.90%	3.15%	3.15%	3.35%	3.35%	3.50%	3.50%	-	-	-	-	-

Please note – The current PWLB rates and forecast shown above have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012

5.2 APPENDIX: Economic Background

UK. UK GDP growth rates of 2.2% in 2013 and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and although the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again, it looks likely to disappoint previous forecasts and come in at about 2.2%. Quarter 1 2015 was weak at +0.4% (+2.9% y/y), although there was a slight increase in quarter 2 to +0.5% before weakening again to +0.4% (+2.1% y/y) in quarter 3 and then picking up to +0.5% (2.2%) in quarter 4.

The Bank of England's February Inflation Report included a forecast for growth to remain around 2.2% – 2.4% over the next three years. For this recovery, however, to become more balanced and sustainable in the longer term, it still needs to move away from dependence on consumer expenditure and the housing market to manufacturing and investment expenditure. The strong growth since 2012 has resulted in unemployment falling quickly to a current level of 5.1%.

Since the August Inflation report was issued, most worldwide economic statistics have been weak and financial markets have been particularly volatile. The November Inflation Report flagged up particular concerns for the potential impact of these factors on the UK. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has set three criteria that need to be met before he would consider making a start on increasing Bank Rate. These criteria are patently not being met at the current time, (as he confirmed in a speech on 19 January):

- *Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth is above 0.6% i.e. using up spare capacity. This condition was met in Q2 2015, but Q3 came up short and Q4 looks likely to also fall short.*
- *Core inflation (stripping out most of the effect of decreases in oil prices), registers a concerted increase towards the MPC's 2% target. This measure was on a steadily decreasing trend since mid-2014 until November 2015 @ 1.2%. December 2015 saw a slight increase to 1.4%.*
- *Unit wage costs are on a significant increasing trend. This would imply that spare capacity for increases in employment and productivity gains are being exhausted, and that further economic growth will fuel inflationary pressures.*

The MPC has been particularly concerned that the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers should be reversed by wage inflation rising back above the level of CPI inflation in order to underpin a sustainable recovery. It has, therefore, been encouraging in 2015 to see wage inflation rising significantly above CPI inflation which has been around zero since February. However, it is unlikely that the MPC would start raising rates until wage inflation was expected to consistently stay over 3%, as a labour productivity growth rate of around 2% would mean that net labour unit costs would still only be rising by about 1% y/y. The November 2015 Inflation Report was notably subdued in respect of the forecasts for CPI inflation; this was expected to barely get back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. The increase in the forecast for inflation at the three year horizon was the biggest in a decade and at the two year horizon it was the biggest since February 2013. However, the first round of falls in oil, gas and food prices in late 2014 and in the first half 2015, will fall out of the 12 month calculation of CPI during late 2015 / early 2016 but only to be followed by a second, subsequent round of falls in fuel and commodity prices which will delay a significant tick up in inflation from around zero. According to the February 2016 Inflation Report, CPI inflation is now expected to get back to around 1% by the end of 2016 but not get near to 2% until the latter part of 2017.

However, with the price of oil having fallen further in January 2016, and with sanctions having been lifted on Iran, enabling it to sell oil freely into international markets, there could well be some further falls still to come in 2016. The price of other commodities exported by emerging countries could also have downside risk and several have seen their currencies already fall by 20-30%, (or more), over the last year. These developments have led to the Bank of England lowering the pace of increases in inflation in its February 2016 Inflation Report.

On the other hand, the start of the national living wage in April 2016 (and further staged increases until 2020), will raise wage inflation; however, it could also result in a decrease in employment so the overall inflationary impact may be muted. For now, the Bank of England is forecasting further falls in unemployment to circa 4.8%.

Confidence is another big issue to factor into forecasting. Recent volatility in financial markets could dampen investment decision making as corporates take a more cautious view of prospects in the coming years due to international risks. This could also impact in a slowdown in increases in employment. However, consumers will be enjoying the increase in disposable incomes as a result of falling prices of fuel, food and other imports from emerging countries, so this could well feed through into an increase in consumer expenditure and demand in the UK economy, (a silver lining!). Another silver lining is that the UK may not be affected as much as some other western countries by a slowdown in demand from emerging countries, as the EU and US are our major trading partners.

There is, therefore, considerable uncertainty around how quickly pay and CPI inflation will rise in the next few years and this makes it difficult to forecast when the MPC will decide to make a start on increasing Bank Rate. There are also concerns around the fact that the central banks of the UK and US currently have few monetary policy options left to them given that central rates are near to zero and huge QE is already in place. There are, accordingly, arguments that rates ought to rise sooner and quicker, so as to have some options available for use if there was another major financial crisis in the near future. But it is unlikely that either would aggressively raise rates until they are sure that growth was securely embedded and 'noflation' was not a significant threat.

The forecast for the first increase in Bank Rate has, therefore, been pushed back progressively over the last year from Q4 2015 to Q1 2017. Increases after that are also likely to be at a much slower pace, and to much lower final levels than prevailed before 2008, as increases in Bank Rate will have a much bigger effect on heavily indebted consumers and householders than they did before 2008. There has also been an increase in momentum towards holding a referendum on membership of the EU in 2016, perhaps as early as June, rather than in 2017; this could impact on MPC considerations to hold off from a first increase until the uncertainty caused by it has passed.

The Government's revised Budget in July eased the pace of cut backs from achieving a budget surplus in 2018/19 to achieving that in 2019/20 and this timetable was maintained in the November Budget.

USA. GDP growth in 2014 of 2.4% was followed by Q1 2015 growth, which was depressed by exceptionally bad winter weather, at only +0.6% (annualised). However, growth rebounded remarkably strongly in Q2 to 3.9% (annualised) before falling back to +2.0% in Q3 and then retreating to +0.7% in Q4.

Until the turmoil in financial markets in August, caused by fears about the slowdown in Chinese growth, it had been strongly expected that the Fed would start to increase rates in September. The Fed pulled back from that first increase due to global risks which might depress US growth and put downward pressure on inflation, as well as a 20% appreciation of the dollar which has caused the Fed to lower its growth forecasts. Although the non-farm payrolls figures for growth in employment in August and September were disappointingly weak, the October figure was stunningly strong while November was also reasonably strong (and December was outstanding); this, therefore, opened up the way for the Fed to embark on its first increase in rates of 0.25% at its December meeting. However, the accompanying message with this first increase was that further increases will be at a much slower rate, and to a much lower ultimate ceiling, than in previous business cycles, mirroring comments by our own MPC.

EZ. In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it is intended to run initially to September 2016. At the ECB's December meeting, this programme was extended to March 2017 but was not increased in terms of the amount of monthly purchases. The ECB also cut its deposit facility rate by 10bps from -0.2% to -0.3%.

This programme of monetary easing has had a limited positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to some improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.3% y/y) but has then eased back to +0.4% (+1.6% y/y) in quarter 2 and to +0.3% (+1.6%) in quarter 3. The initial reading for Q4 is 0.3% also. Financial markets were disappointed by the ECB's lack of more decisive action in December and it is likely that it will need to boost its QE programme if it is to succeed in significantly improving growth in the EZ and getting inflation up from the current level of around zero to its target of 2%.

Greece. During July, Greece finally capitulated to EU demands to implement a major programme of austerity. An €86bn third bailout package has since been agreed although it did nothing to address the unsupportable size of total debt compared to GDP. However, huge damage has been done to the Greek banking system and economy by the initial resistance of the Syriza Government, elected in January, to EU demands. The surprise general election in September gave the Syriza government a mandate to stay in power to implement austerity measures. However, there are major doubts as to whether the size of cuts and degree of reforms required can be fully implemented and so a Greek exit from the euro may only have been delayed by this latest bailout.

Portugal and Spain. The general elections in September and December respectively have opened up new areas of political risk where the previous right wing reform-focused pro-austerity mainstream political parties have lost their majority of seats. A left wing / communist anti-austerity coalition has won a majority of seats in Portugal. The general election in Spain produced a complex result where no combination of two main parties is able to form a coalition with a majority of seats. It is currently unresolved as to what administrations will result from both these situations. This has created nervousness in bond and equity markets for these countries which has the potential to spill over and impact on the whole Eurozone project.

China and Japan. Japan is causing considerable concern as the increase in sales tax in April 2014 suppressed consumer expenditure and growth. In Q2 2015 quarterly growth shrank by -0.2% after a short burst of strong growth of 1.1% during Q1, but then came back to +0.3% in Q3 after the first estimate had indicated that Japan had fallen back into recession; this would have been the fourth recession in five years. Japan has been hit hard by the downturn in China during 2015 and there are continuing concerns as to how effective efforts by the Abe government to stimulate growth, and increase the rate of inflation from near zero, are likely to prove when it has already fired the first two of its 'arrows' of reform but has dithered about firing the third, deregulation of protected and inefficient areas of the economy.

As for China, the Government has been very active during 2015 and the start of 2016 in implementing several stimulus measures to try to ensure the economy hits the growth target of about 7% for 2015. It has also sought to bring some stability after the major fall in the onshore Chinese stock market during the summer and then a second bout in January 2016. Many commentators are concerned that recent growth figures could have been massaged to hide a downturn to a lower growth figure. There are also major concerns as to the creditworthiness of much of bank lending to corporates and local government during the post 2008 credit expansion period. Overall, China is still expected to achieve a growth figure that the EU would be envious of. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns about whether the Chinese economy could be heading for a hard landing and weak progress in rebalancing the economy from an over dependency on manufacturing and investment to consumer demand led services. There are also concerns over the volatility of the Chinese stock market, which was the precursor to falls in world financial markets in August and September and again in January 2016, which could lead to a flight to quality to bond markets. In addition, the international value of the Chinese currency has been on a steady trend of weakening and this will put further downward pressure on the currencies of emerging countries dependent for earnings on exports of their commodities.

Emerging countries. There are also considerable concerns about the vulnerability of some emerging countries, and their corporates, which are getting caught in a perfect storm. Having borrowed massively in dollar denominated debt since the financial crisis, (as investors searched for yield by channelling investment cash away from western economies with dismal growth, depressed bond yields and near zero interest rates into emerging countries), there is now a strong flow back to those western economies with strong growth and a path of rising interest rates and bond yields.

The currencies of emerging countries have therefore been depressed by both this change in investors' strategy, and the consequent massive reverse cash flow, and also by the expectations of a series of central interest rate increases in the US which has caused the dollar to appreciate significantly. In turn, this has made it much more costly for emerging countries to service their dollar denominated debt at a time when their earnings from commodities are depressed by a simultaneous downturn in demand for their exports and deterioration in the value of their currencies. There are also likely to be major issues when previously borrowed debt comes to maturity and requires refinancing at much more expensive rates.

Corporates (worldwide) heavily involved in mineral extraction and / or the commodities market may also be at risk and this could also cause volatility in equities and safe haven flows to bonds. Financial markets may also be buffeted by the sovereign wealth funds of those countries that are highly exposed to falls in commodity prices and which, therefore, may have to liquidate investments in order to cover national budget deficits.

CAPITA ASSET SERVICES FORWARD VIEW

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Capita Asset Services undertook its last review of interest rate forecasts on 12 February 2016. Our Bank Rate forecasts, (and also MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data evolves over time. There is much volatility in rates and bond yields as news ebbs and flows in negative or positive ways. This latest forecast includes a first increase in Bank Rate in quarter 1 of 2017.

The overall trend in the longer term will be for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise when economic recovery is firmly established accompanied by rising inflation and consequent increases in Bank Rate, and the eventual unwinding of QE. At some future point in time, an increase in investor confidence in eventual world economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as recovery will encourage investors to switch from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently to the downside, given the number of potential headwinds that could be growing on both the international and UK scene. Only time will tell just how long this current period of strong economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas. However, the overall balance of risks to our Bank Rate forecast is probably to the downside, i.e. the first increase, and subsequent increases, may be delayed further if recovery in GDP growth, and forecasts for inflation increases, are lower than currently expected. Market expectations in February 2016, (based on short sterling), for the first Bank Rate increase are currently around quarter 1 2018.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Emerging country economies, currencies and corporates destabilised by falling commodity prices and / or Fed. rate increases, causing a flight to safe havens
- Geopolitical risks in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, increasing safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US; resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Recapitalisation of European banks requiring more government financial support.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth and combat the threat of deflation in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- Uncertainty around the risk of a UK exit from the EU. The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

5.3 APPENDIX: Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

The CLG issued Investment Guidance in 2010, and this forms the structure of the Council's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.

The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this Council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes. This Council has formally adopted the Code and will apply its principles to all investment activity. In accordance with the Code, the Financial Services Manager has produced its treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

Annual investment strategy - The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of following:

- The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments, particularly non-specified investments.
- The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.
- Specified investments that the Council will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the Council, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than a year.
- Non-specified investments, clarifying the greater risk implications, identifying the general types of investment that may be used and a limit to the overall amount of various categories that can be held at any time.

The investment policy proposed for the Council is:

Strategy guidelines – The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

Specified investments – These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity, or those which could be for a longer period but where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These are considered low risk assets where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include sterling investments which would not be defined as capital expenditure with:

1. The UK Government (such as the Debt Management Account deposit facility, UK treasury bills or a gilt with less than one year to maturity).
2. A principal local authority.
3. Pooled investment vehicles (such as money market funds) that have been awarded a high credit rating (AAA) by a credit rating agency.
4. A body that is considered of a high credit quality (such as a bank or building society).

Within these bodies, and in accordance with the Code, the Council has set additional criteria to set the time and amount of monies which will be invested with these bodies.

Non-specified investments – are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as specified above). Examples include gilts, supranational bonds and fixed term deposits with banks and building societies with a duration greater than 1 year. On current plans it is not expected that the Council will use any non-specified investments.

Summary of Proposed Counterparty / Investment type for 2016/17

Sector / Investment Type	Minimum Credit Criteria / Colour Band	£ Limit per institution / investment	Maximum maturity period
DMADF – UK Government	N/a	Unlimited	6 months
UK Government T-Bills	UK sovereign rating	£2.5m	1 – 6 months
Money Market Funds (currently CCLA Public Sector Deposit Fund only but to be reviewed in 2016)	AAA	£1m	Liquid funds
Principal Local Authorities	N/a	£3m (£6m for Lancashire County Council)	364 days
Term Deposits with UK banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green No colour	Range between £2.5m and £5m (£5m is restricted to Lloyds Group only - as banker to the Council)	Up to 364 days Up to 364 days Up to 6 months Up to 100 days Not for use
Certificates of Deposit (CDs) with designated UK banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green No colour	£2m	Up to 364 days Up to 364 days Up to 6 months Up to 100 days Not for use
Term deposits / instant access accounts with Non-UK banks meeting approved credit criteria	Red Green	£2.5m £1m	Up to 6 months Up to 100 days

5.4 APPENDIX: Approved countries for investments

Based on the lowest rating by each of the 3 rating agencies as at 4th March 2016

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- U.K.
- U.S.A.

5.5 APPENDIX: Treasury management scheme of delegation

(i) Full Council

- Initial approval and adoption of Treasury Management Policy Statement and subsequent revisions;
- Approval of Annual Treasury Management Strategy / Annual Investment Strategy and policy on Minimum Revenue Provision (i.e. this report) and consideration and approval of any in year changes.

(ii) Executive

- Annual Treasury Management outturn report
- Mid-year Treasury Management rport

(iii) Accounts and Audit Committee

- Apropoval of / amendments to the Council's adopted treasury management practices;
- Receiving and reviewing regular monitoringr reports and acting on recommendations;
- Scrutiny of treasury management performance and strategy.

(**iv) Section 151 Officer (Financial Services Manager)**

- To manage internal capital provisions and reserves and to supervise the investment of Council monies in accordance with the approved Treasury Management Strategy.
- Reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.

5.6 APPENDIX: The treasury management role of the Sction 151 officer

The S151 Officer (Financial Services Manager)

The day to day management of the Council's treasury management activities rests with the Council's Financial Services Manager who has the statutory Section 151 responsibility. Within the overall scheme of delegation this role is responsible for:

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.